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ABSTRACT
Spot pricing covers a range of electric utility pricing structures
which relate the marginal costs of electric generation to the prices seen
by utility customers. At the shortest time frames prices change every
five minutes--the same time frame as used in utility dispatch--longer
time frames might include 24-hour updating in which prices are set one
day in advance but vary hourly as a function of projected system
operating costs. The critical concept is that customers see and respond
to marginal rather than average costs. In addition the concept of spot
pricing includes a "quality of supply" component by which prices are
increased at times in which the system is approaching maximum capacity,
thus providing a pricing mechanism to replace or augment rationing.
This research project evaluated the potential for spot pricing of
industrial customers from the perspective both of the utility and its
customers. A prototype Wisconsin (based on the WFPCO system) and its
industrial customers was evaluated assuming 1980 demand level and tariff
structures. The utility system was simplified to include limited
interconnection and exchange of power with. surrounding utilities. The
analysis was carried out using an hourly simulation model, ENPRO, to
evaluate the marginal operating cost for any hour. The industrial energy
demand was adjusted to reflect the price (relative to the present
time-of-use pricing system). The simulation was then rerun to calculate
the change in revenues (and customer bill) and the amount of consumer
surplus generated.
A second analysis assumed a 5 percent increase in demand with no
ii
increase in capacity. Each analysis was carried out for an assumed low
and high industrial response to price changes.
In an effort to generalize beyond the Wisconsin data and to evaluate
the likely implications of a flexible pricing scheme relative to a
utility system with a greater level of oil generation, particularly on
the margin, the system capacity of the study utility was altered by
substitution of a limited number of coal plants by identical but with
higher-fuel cost oil-fired plants. The analyses for the modified utility
structure are parallel to those for the standard utility structure
discussed above.
The results of the analysis showed that the flexible pricing system
produced both utility and customer savings. At lower capacity
utilization the utility recovered less revenue than it did under the
present time-of-use rates. While at higher utilization it recovered
more. Under all scenarios tested, consumer surplus benefits were five to
ten times greater than were simple fuel savings for the utility. While
these results must be evaluated in additional testing of specific
customer response patterns, it is significant to note that the ability of
the customer to choose his pattern more flexibly holds a significant
potential for customers to achieve greater surplus--even if their bill
may in fact increase. These results are discussed in detail in the
report as are a number of customer bill impact considerations and the
issues associated with revenue reconciliation.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Electricity rate structures have been the subject of extensive
theoretical as well as experimental investigation and in some cases
widespread application. A major EPRI study recently completed provides
extensive background.* The various proposed or implemented rate
structures have sought improvements in a wide range of social objectives
including not only cost of electricity generation but also reliability of
supply, utility profits, customer benefits, and even income
distribution. The nature of electricity demand and generation
characterized by both cyclic and random variations in load and available
generation capacity has affected the design of rate structures. Another
means of achieving improvements in the above objectives which has
recently received increased attention has been direct load control.
This report examines a concept of electricity pricing referred to as
spot pricing.** Spot pricing has been shown in theory to encompass and
achieve more fully the objectives of most rate structures and load
control and management techniques proposed in the past.
Spot pricing is an approach to electric power systems pricing which
does away with concepts such as block rates, demand charges, backup
charges and capacity credits) Instead, an energy marketplace for
electricity is established which determines the spot price of electricity
by the supply and demand conditions, that is, the marginal value of
*EPRI, Electric Utility Rate Design Study, Palo Alto, 1979.
**In the literature this has also been referred to as responsive
pricing, real time pricing and flexible pricing.
I_ _ _
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consumption and generation of electricity at each instant. Optimal spot
pricing is desirable because it improves the efficiency of the electric
power system. It can significantly improve the well-being of both
generators and customers through lower costs, fewer blackouts and
brownouts, easier integration of customer-owned generation and other
advantages. It can give higher profits for both the utility and its
customers.
The first chapter of this report sets forth the theoretical issues
associated with flexible or spot pricing. Chapter Two provides the
derivation of optimal spot prices and their effect on generation,
transmission and distribution constraints; transaction costs; and
intertemporal demand interdependencies. Optimal predetermined prices for
small or unresponsive consumers (who would not justify their spot pricing
because the associated transactions and communications costs overshadow
potential benefits) are also derived. Pricing period lengths and optimal
assignment of customers to a range of rate structures from real time spot
pricing to predetermined prices is also considered. Utility and consumer
investment rules under spot pricing are developed and optimal buy-back
rates for non-utility-owned generation are addressed. Finally, revenue
reconciliation issues are discussed and a comparison of spot pricing to
the related pricing literature is undertaken.
Chapter Three presents the data, the algorithm and the general
analytic results. Chapter Four presents the results of the case study
focusing on the potential benefits of bringing large WEPCO industrial
consumers under spot pricing. Revenue reconciliation issues and the
distrbution of benefits are addressed. The main thrust of the case
study, however, is directed at providing estimates of potential fuel
. I IIIM II,
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savings, consumer surplus gains, reduction of reserve capacity
requirements and trends of a desired reoptimization in generating
capacity mix.
Chapter Five examines the potential impact of spot pricing on
individual customer bills to identify potential cross-subsidies among
customers. The characteristics of individual large customer demand
profiles are also presented.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORY
2.1. Introduction
Flexible or spot prices are prices which fluctuate over time in
response to the current condition of the utility system. Spot pricing
combines the best features of direct load control/direct central
dispatching with those of time-of-use pricing. This gives real time
feedback and control with customer independence and no need for central
knowledge of customer requirements or status. Spot pricing is an
approach to electric power systems pricing which does away with concepts
such as block rate, demand charges, back-up charges, capacity credits,
and so on. Instead, an energy marketplace for electric power is
established. The spot price for buying and selling electric energy is
determined by the supply and demand conditions at that instant.
Optimal spot pricing is desirable because it improves the efficiency
of the electric power system. It can significantly improve the well
being of the utility system (generators and customers) through lower
costs, fewer blackouts and browjnouts, easier integration of customer
owned generation, and other advantages. It can give higher profits for
both the utility and its customers. Examples of the impacts of optimal
spot pricing include:
o Reduction of oil consumed in generation by raising prices explicitly
whenever oil is being used.
o Removal or reduction of the need for rotating blackouts to handle
emergency generation shortage situations, by using prices to give an
automatic socially efficient rationing system.
o Enhancement of and integration of wind, solar, and customer-owned
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cogeneration into the grid by providing an energy marketplace which
values energy at its "true" value. Variable charges, back-up
charges, and capacity credits are not needed.
Optimal spot prices have the disadvantage of requiring rapid
communications between the customer and the utility and of requiring
extensive metering and control equipment. This report summarizes a
number of pricing options which achieve nearly all of the advantages of
the shorter time spot pricing schemes while lowering the communication,
metering and control costs of both the customer and the utility.
The purpose of this chapter is to set forth the theoretical issues
associated with spot pricing.* The chapter is detailed in its approach
to spot pricing as it takes the perspective of social welfare economics.
For the reader wishing to skip over the theoretical development it is
suggested that they read only the major points listed at the end of
Sections 2.2 through 2.5 and the graphical presentation in Section 2.2B.
The chapter is organized as follows: The derivation of optimal
(instantaneous) spot prices is provided in Section 2.2, together with
consideration of the effects of generation, transmission and distribution
constraints; transaction costs; and time dependent customer demands. The
derivation of optimal predetermined prices is set forth in Section 2.3.
In Section 2.3 pricing period lengths, customer class assignment and
optimal rationing of customers on predetermined rates are also
considered. Utility and consumer investment rules under flexible or spot
pricing are developed in Section 2.4. Optimal buy-back rates for
*This chapter draws heavily upon Bohn r19821, 3ohn, CaramanisSchweppe [1981], Caramanis, Bohn Schweppe 1982], Caramanis [1982 and
Kepner [1982].
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non-utility-owned generation is addressed in Section 2.5. Revenue
reconciliation issues are raised in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 contains a
discussion of the related pricing literature.
2.2. Deriving Optimal Spot Prices
2.2.A) Assumptions and Pricing Rules
A utility system is composed of centrally owned and controlled
generating plants, independent customers, and the transmission and
distribution (T and D) system which links them. The utility must
choose:
o the output of each of its generating units;
o the price to each customer; and
o investments in future generating plants and the T and D system.
The utility must make these decisions to meet the following
constraints:
o Total generation must equal line losses plus total demand at
each moment;
o No generating unit can have an output higher than its available
capacity;
o Demands and unit availability vary stochastically; and
o Transmission and distribution capabilities cannot be exceeded.
Spot pricing theory provides rules for both optimal short-run
decisions and optimal long-run action (investments). Here we concentrate
on the "operational problems," assuming that investments in power plants,
transmission and distribution networks (T and D), and customer equipment
are already in place. These investments can be chosen based on
anticipated spot prices (see Section 2.4).
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The derivation of spot pricing proceeds as follows. Different paths
of electricity use and investment over time lead to different social
welfare levels. For electric power production and consumption social
welfare function is defined as:
Value of Variable and
Welfare = Electricity - Fuel Costs
Usage
(1)
Cost of Cost of
- Rationing Equipment
The first two terms (value of usage and cost of fuel) are random
variables, as they depend on random plant and network outages, weather,
customer desires, etc. The cost of rationing term would always be zero
if all customers were on optimal spot pricing. The general theory covers
the case of two coexisting groups of customers; one under spot pricing
and the other on predetermined prices. In emergencies, the predetermined
price customers may have to be rationed (see Section 2.3).
If we take the perspective of a global controller, the decision
variables are the generation level of each generating unit, and the usage
level of each customer device, at each moment. The objective is to
maximize social welfare. The calculus of variations gives the conditions
on the decision variables which must be satisfied. Two explicit sets of
constraints are imposed on the optimization:
Energy Balance Constraint:
Total Generation = Total Consumption + Losses (2)
Network Constraints:
Voltage magnitude and line flow constraints (3)
These constraints explicitly involve the random variables of weather and
outages, and the decision variables of generation and demand at each
point in the network.
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The constrained optimization conditions are satisfied by optimal spot
pricing in conjunction with standard economy dispatching. If proper spot
prices are set each customer will reach the socially optimal usage level
as a result of its own efforts to maximize profits.
The resulting spot prices are explicit functions of all random
variables, and therefore change over time as these random variables
change.* The general formulas can be interpreted as:
Optimum Marginal Energy T and D
Spot = Fuel Cost + Balance + Network (4)
Price Quality Quality
of Supply of Supply
Premium Premium
There are separate spot prices for real and reactive energy.
The marginal fuel. cost component of equation (4) is the incremental
fuel cost of the most expensive unit currently loaded in the system
(generators should be dispatched in optimal loading order, as is the
present practice) appropriately corrected for transmission and
distribution losses. It is close to the conventional "system lambda,"
with an additional location specific correction for losses. Since losses
vary by location, each customer sees a slightly different price.
The energy balance quality of supply premium of equation (4) is zero
at all times when there is surplus generation or tie-line capacity. If
all generators are in use and no additional energy is available over tie
lines, then the premium is added to the'price to reduce denand or
increase customer generation until the energy balance constraint of
*Ijote that all utility rates can be expressed as the expected value
over some time cycle period of the optimal spot price. A marginal time
of use rate is the expected value of the optimal spot price for fixed
time blocks (i.e. 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.) for the price update cycle (i.e. one
month or a season).
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equation (2) is met. The premium is then the difference between the
incremental value of electrical usage for the incremental custoner, and
the marginal fuel cost. It varies by customer to the extent that
transmission and distribution losses vary by customer.
The quality of supply premium associated with the T and D network
arises because of the network constraints of equation (3). Ahen neither
the line flow constraints nor the voltage magnitude constraints are
active, then the premium is zero. 'hen the constraints are active, the
premium is an extra pricing signal which is sent to customers until they
readjust their usage and generation (if they have it) patterns to remove
the line overload or voltage imbalance. This component is heavily
variable between customers, as the physical location of the customer has
a major impact on the network constraints. Notice that the network
quality of supply premium can be either positive or negative, depending
on what type of readjustments in generation/usage patterns are required.
In some circumstances it is conceivable that a customer should be
encouraged to increase its usage.
When loss coefficients are incorporated, spot prices for reactive
power are developed analogous to the prices for real power. In theory,
there should be a different price for real and reactive energy at each
point in the T and D network, implying that each customer should
continuously see two prices. In practice, the price of reactive energy
will not vary significantly, nor will a customer's power factor change
greatly over time. Therefore spot pricing of reactive energy could be
approximated (for all but the largest customers) by assuming a constant
power factor for all customers in a class, where class is determined by
voltage level of service and general location in the T and D network.
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The customer would then see a single price for real + reactive energy.
2.2.) Graphical Representation
It is instructive to formulate the spot pricing problem graphically.
Figure 2.1 shows the instataneous marginal variable generating cost
function for a given utility system.
Figure 2.1
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Figure 2.2 shows the analogous diagram for instantaneous customer demand.
Figure 2.2
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Figure 2.3 shows the optimal price level (p*) when the instantaneous
quantity demanded at the optimal price does not exceed the maximum
generating (or T and D) capacity.
Figure 2.3
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Figure 2.4 shows the optimal spot price (p*) when 'available capacity is
fully used. Note that the premium (p* - p), or the difference between
the optinal spot price and the marginal generating cost of the last unit
produced, is the quality of supply premium.
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2.2.C) Time Interdependendency
The basic optimal spot pricing results are derived without
consideration of the time interdependency of demand. These
interdependencies (such as storage or production rescheduling) can,
however, easily be incorporated into the basic spot pricing framework.
Time is introduced by recognizing that past and future consumption levels
are relevant to customer decisions concerning storage, rescheduling, and
other intertemporal processes of concern. Incorporating time demand
interdependencies leads to analogous spot pricing results. The optimal
spot price is the sum of a quality of supply component and marginal
generating costs. bMarginal generating cost, however, is calculated as
the expected impact of incremental generation now on current variable
generating costs and variable generating costs in the next few periods.
2.2.0) Transaction Costs
If the demand for and the supply of electricity could equilibrate
instantly under a spot pricing system, and if the "transaction costs" of
spot pricing were zero, all customers should be placed on a spot pricing
schedule. tNot all customers, however, could respond instantaneously to a
spot price signal. And neither are the transaction costs--which include
the cost of utility and customer premise's equipment, price calculation,
and signal transmission--likely to be zero. Further, instantaneously
varying price signals may be administratively impractical. Consequently
pricing periods of varying lengths may be more appropriate. It is to the
question of setting the predetermined prices for the various pricing
periods which we turn in the next section.
1- -- - -- =Ili oIlill
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2.3. Optimal Predetermined Prices
2.3.A) Assumptions and Pricing Rules
The full spot prices derived and discussed above are "optimal" only
with no transactions costs. .4hen transactions costs are considered, it
generally will be preferable to aggregate prices over time cycles (from
minutes to months), over classes of customers (residential...industrial)
and/or over service regions (the area of a specific substation).
Different rates, with their own amount of aggregation, may be optimal for
different participants. Rates here are "optimal," for a given level of
aggregation, under the assumptions that:
o Only "first best" welfare issues are considered.
o If multiple rates, and hence multiple prices at one instant, are
used, no arbitrage selling is permitted between participants on
different rates.
In theory each participant (customer or generator) should have its
own spot price, reflecting its unique impacts on system losses, line
flows, and line voltages. In practice such a pricing system will be
overly sophisticated for most customers. Therefore simpler versions of
spot pricing are proposed, to be adapted to individual utilities and
customers.
Under realistic implementations of spot pricing, not all participants
will receive real-time updates of the spot price. Some customers will
get price updates only daily, monthly, or even yearly. This will hold
down metering and communications costs. In this case the price at time t
cannot reflect the actual values of random variables at time t, but
instead must he set based on the expected values of those random
variables, conditional on information available at the time these prices
II, I, , JI , i, L ill ii IIIII l , ,
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are set. We will call these "predetermined" prices, recognizing that
they are not truly predetermined forever, but only until the next
update. In general, the optimal predetermined price for time t is given
by:
Optimal Expected
Predetermined = Value of + Covariance (5)
Price Optimal Spot Term
Price
The covariance term depends on the customer's demand and its correlation
to the spot price. It is positive for most customers.
2.3.B) Pricing Periods
Most of the practical considerations involved in setting "spot"
prices can be understood for the special case of equation (5) in which
there are no quality of supply components, no losses, and only real
energy is priced. This is the easiest version of spot pricing to
implement. -
The theory developed in Section 2.2 does not explicitly consider the
cost of communicating the spot price to customers and metering their
use. If these costs were zero then all customers should receive the
instantaneous spot price, in continuous time. A more realistic approach
is to implement spot pricing using one of the following new or restated
types of spot price based rates:
5 MINUTE SPOT PRICE. The shortest time varying rate discussed. The
pricing cycle is five minutes reflecting the expected cost of generation
plus transaction costs and T and D for each five minutes projected five
minutes ahead. The information utilized is analogous to the time frame
used by the system dispatcher and incorporates system lambda or its
equivalent as the marginal operating cost.
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1 HOUR SPOT PRICE. Equivalent ot the 5 minute spot price with
recalculation on a 1 hour cycle. This study of Aisconsin examined the
benefits of a 1 hour spot price structure.
Calculating the proper level of each price can be done using existing
mathematical methods and even computer programs, since the different
prices are analogous to existing problems in generation dispatch.
Five-minute spot pricing is analogous to economic dispatch, and the price
is responsive to random weather variations, unexpected plant outages, and
T+D failures. Twenty-four hour update spot pricing is analogous to unit
commitment, and reflects known outages and the daily weather forecast.
Time-of-use predetermined price is analogous to maintenance scheduling
and nuclear unit refueling, and can reflect only the normal pattern of
demand and precipitation (on a hydro system).
The only major new development needed to calculate properly each of
these prices in real time is the development of a short-term demand
response model. Such a model can be developed from experience as spot
pricing is gradually implemented by a utility. When we ignore losses and
the T+D system, all custmers on one pricing system see the same price.
This simplifies calculations.
2.3.C) Customer Assignment
Different customers should be assigned to different price systems
depending on their size and ability to respond to more sophisticated
prices. Metering and communication costs depend mainly on the price
system, not on the customer. The cost of even 5-minute spot pricing will
be trivial for large industrial or commercial customers. Small
residential customers whose demands are too small to justify the cost of
a recording meter should be on time-of-use predetermined pricing. Other
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custolers should probably be on 24-hour update spot pricing. Of course,
still other pricing systems are feasible and should be used if the net
benefits compare favorably to those under the three systems discussed
above. Customers should be allowed to self-select their pricing system
provided that they pay all incremental metering and communications costs.
Several points should be noted about how customers should be assigned
to different rates.
o The social welfare maximizing rate for each customer depends on
the customer's size and how it would behave under various rates,
and on the transactions costs of different rates.
o Any rate other than full spot pricing can create a subsidy, that
is, a wedge between private and social costs. This subsidy can
be positive or negative and is customer specific. It must be
made up by the utility or other customers. Therefore which rate
a customer is on affects profit distribution as well as total
social welfare.
o Therefore, customers will not always voluntarily choose the
socially prefered rate for themselves.
o The utility cannot adjust rates so that "on average" customers
will self assign to the socially prefered rate or close to it.
The problem is analagous to what happens in competitive
insurance markets with adverse selection: those receiving large
positive subsidies under a rate drive everyone else off that
rate.
o Mandatory assignment of customers to rates, which is standard
practise for some public utilities, cannot be done optimally
either. Such assignment would require unobservable customer
specific information.
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o In practice a combination of mandatory and voluntary assignment
will probably give "reasonably good" results, and is the best
that can be done.
Which rate a customer or independent generator is assigned to will
affect three costs:
o Communications and other transactions costs.
o The value of electricity used by the customer in response to
prices under the rate.
o The customer's value added as a result of its electricity use.
Both the social and private assignment criteria are: "assign the
customer to the rate which maximizes its expected value added, minus
transactions costs and the expected value of electricity used." This sum
is the net social or private welfare gain under a rate. The-difference
between social and private criteria is that a profit maximizing customer
will value electricity at its price under the rate in question, whereas
the social value of the electricity used is always the full spot price at
the moment of use. Under any rate except full spot pricing there will be
a divergence between social and private value; therefore the customer
will compare rates differently than will a.social welfare maximizer.
Several implications can be drawn for comparing two rates, one of
which may be full spot prices:
o If a customer's behavior will be the same on one rate as on the
other, then the rate with the lower transactions costs is
socially preferable for that customer.
o The gross social welfare change will depend on the customer's
size and responsiveness to spot prices. It will therefore be
socially optimal to use more sophisticated pricing methods for
- - Y
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customers which are larger or more responsive (in percentage of
demand) to prices.
o If two rates have the same transactions costs, the one which is
closer to full spot prices should be used.
o Whether a customer self-selects the socially optimal rate depends
on its subsidy, which is a weighted average of the difference
between the spot price and the predetermined price. The larger
the absolute value of the subsidy, the less likely the customer
is to select the socially desired rate. The subsidy may be
positive or negative.
o Customers with weather sensitive loads which are correlated with
spot price will tend to have larger subsidies under any
predetermined price than do other customers.
o Customers with weekday only demands (KwH) will be susbsidized by
flat non time-of-day rates.
In order to decide what rate a customer should be on, the utility
needs to know something about how the customer would behave under
alternate rates, and what the value of that change in behavior is to
the customer. These will depend on the customer's options to
substitute electricity for electricity at a different time and for
other inputs to production. No central utility can know each
customer's opportunity set. Even for classes of customers with many
members, experimental methods will mainly give an indication of the
mean and variance of changes in gross social welfare under different
rates, which is not sufficient.
A reasonable approach to the assignment problem is therefore to
use a mixture of mandatory and voluntary assignment. Participants can
In mi llaiH imumYIMIIIMhIMIYi
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be divided into classes based on more-or-less exogenous
characteristics, as is done today. Ownership of particular types of
capital, such as electrical or thermal storage equipment, would be an
important critierion for membership in some groups. lithin each class
participants might be offered a choice from among two or more rates,
with the range of choices overlapping among different classes. It is
important to remember that the optimal range of rates and "optimal"
assignment rule will be utility-specific.
It is not possible a prior to state the precise implications of
these points for individual of today's customer classes. Several
general conclusions can, however, be drawn. .The first is that larger
customers with reschedulable loads will be those that will benefit the
greatest from shorter time period spot price rates. Because of their
size the benefits will be sufficient to warrant investment in capital
and control system to take advantage of the rates. Because their
loads may be rescheduled they will have maximum flexibility in
shifting in response to price. Smaller customers will be able to take
advantage of different of the spot price related rates including those
that are now refered to as load control in which the utility is
providing the service of 'shedding' of specific customer functions.
The benefit to be gained from such systems will determine both the
customer participants and the level of automation in control that is
cost justified. Additional analysis and research is required to
understand the ability of different types of customers to respond to
various spot price systems based on different price update cycles.
How many rates to offer depends on the relative transactions
costs and social welfare benefits of additional rates. Each new rate
e. ....- . .- - .. .
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carries with it some transactions costs which are independent of the
number of participants on that rate. If all these costs were zero, it
would be optimal to have-an infinite spectrum of rates. Instead, the
additional transactions costs must be weighed against the improvement
in net social surplus for participants asigned to this rate instead of
the previously available rates. An additional rate will be more
desirable the better the method for assigning participants to it.
2.3.D) .ationing
1What if customer response to a rise in the spot orice is not
large enough to avoid a problem entirely This may not happen, for
example, on systems where only a few customers are on 5-minute spot
pricing. In this situation, the necessary response will be identical
to present practice, namely rotating blackouts.
In practice, rationing will be appropriate mainly when the
curtailment premium reaches levels close to the average disruption
cost of rationing a group of non spot customers. Rationing these
customers is then socially preferable to making customers on full spot
pricing voluntarily curtail further in reponse to still higher spot
prices.
Thus under optimal utility behavior:
o The possibility of rationing effectively puts an upper bound
on spot prices, equal to the marginal disruption losses
caused by rationing.
o The more participants are on spot pricing, the less often
rationing will be needed for other participants, since the
more likely that demand can be held down at spot prices
below the disruption cost of rationing.
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o The probability that a customer will be rationed is an
increasing function of the difference between spot and
predetermined prices. When multiple rate classes may exist
with different rules for updating their prices, all else
equal, participants on infrequently updated prices will be
rationed most often, since their prices will have the
largest forecast errors.
One special case corresponds to present utility operation. If
all participants are on the same non-spot prices then the curtailment
premium jumps from zero to the social loss due to rotating blackouts
or whatever rationing method the utility uses.
As a practical matter, those customers on 5-minute pricing are
effectively never subject to involuntary blackout--instead they
voluntarily back off as the spot price is raised. When the spot price
reaches a certain level if demand is still too high, rotating
blackouts should be applied to customers on time-of-use pricing and
24-hour update pricing. Customers on 24-hour update pricing will
never be subjected to rotating blackouts for more than 24 hours.
Instead, their price will be raised to induce voluntary cutbacks.
There are two practical problems with the rationing rate.
Although there is a mathematical expression for the critical level of
spot price at which the price should stop rising and rationing be
used, calculating this price will require a combination of survey
information and political considerations. The interests of customers
on different prices will be opposed.
The second problem is that customers on 5-minute pricing may be
served by the same portion of the distribution system as other
MIN01II1111,
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customers. It would then be difficult to apply rotating blackouts to
all time-of-use customers without cutting off the 5-minute customer.
2.4. Investment Behavior
2.4.A) Utility Investment Under Spot Pricing
(1) Generation
Optimal spot prices determine the revenues accruing to generating
units. 14henever the spot price is equal to or exceeds a generating
unit's variable cost, it is profitable for that unit to generate. The
investment conditions discussed below imply that social welfare is
maximized if enough capacity of each generation type is installed to
render the present value of the expected net income stream associated
with incremental investment equal to its cost. If the above present
value exceeds incremental investment costs for a particular generation
type, it is optimal to install more capacity of that type. On the
other hand, costs exceeding revenues is an indication of
overi nvestment.
(2) Transmission and Distribution
The necessary conditions for T+D optimal investment are:
Cost of Transportation Voltage Shifting of
Incremental = Losses Related + Magnitude + Network (6)
Investment in Term and Line Flow Constraint
T+D Capital Related Term Limits Term
Stock
Eq. (6) may be interpreted as follows. The first term represents the
impact of incremental investment on losses evaluated at the spot price
marginal operating cost and energy balance premium components. The
second term represents the impact of incremental investment on easing
bindinj line flow and voltage levels evaluated at the T+D constraint
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premium. Finally, the third term represents the impact on constraint
limits.
Customers contribute to T+D revenues according to their location,
electricity usage characteristics and usage-related benefits. Hence, the
impact of T+D investments (lines, transformers, etc.) will in turn
benefit customers in proportion to their contribution. Of course, in the
case of new area development, anticipated future customer usage will
provide for the investment's payback. It should be finally noted that
because of the location specific contribution of electricity usage to T+D
revenues, optimal spot pricing establishes a socially efficient
"wheeling" charge.
2.4.B) Customer Investment Under Spot Pricing
There is a variety of investments which customers can make to reduce
the cost of electricity under spot pricing. For customers designing new
production facilities, the availability of spot prices may be a design
parameter for capacity decision in the production process. In existing
facilities the availablility of spot rates may encourage rescheduling of
energy intensive processes or the investment storage of specific
capacity. For others there may be equipment which can be -retrofit within
an existing factory.
Specifically, possible customer investments include:
1. Building a cogeneration system instead of a simple boiler. The
electricity demand of customers with cogeneration will depend
heavily on the steam demand; but when the spot price is high
enough cogenerators will be willing to maximize electricity
production even if this requires wasting some steam. There are
incentives for installing cogeneration even with constant
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predetermined prices, but the value of each kilowatt of
cogeneration capacity will be higher under spot pricing than
under predetermined prices with the same mean.
2. Thermal storage equipment, such as chilled water tanks for air
conditioning or refrigeration. This effectively allows storage
of electricity in the form of thermal energy. This storage can
be "filled up" when price is low, and "discharged" when it is
high.
3. More efficient motors, better insulation, and other conventional
methods for reducing total demand.
4. Increased pump and pipe capacity for agricultural irrigation and
other fluid pumping applications. They would be used to conduct
non critical pumping at times of lowest electricity cost (i.e.,
during the night and on weekends). Again, such investments
would have some value under time-of-day pricing, but would be
encouraged more by spot pricing.
5. Communications equipment to receive or forecast the spot price.
Some small customers may find they can do an adequate job of
estimating the spot price based on the day of the week, time of
day, and current weather. Most large customers will prefer to
install a real-time communications link to the utility (or
another source) to learn the current and projected future spot
price.
The socially optimum conditions for customer investment are:
Cost of Participant j Participant j
Incremental = Magnitude + Electricity (7)
Investment Constraint- Usage-
by Partici- Related Related
pant j Gains Gains
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It should be noted that the quantities involved in evaluating the above
terms are all random variables whose probability distribution generally
changes from year to year (or month to month). Thus, expected
incremental benefits should be discounted over the life of the investment.
The conditions of eq. (7) are identical to individual participant
profit maximization conditions if social and private discount rates are
equal. Thus, optimal spot pricing can be shown to internalize system
costs and benefits and yield identical social welfare and
profit-maximizing investment behavior. Hence, spot price participants
are expected to exhibit socially efficient investment behavior.
2.4.C) Customer Investment Under Predetermined Prices
As already mentioned, predetermined price participants will represent
a substantial segment of customers, especially during the initial stages
of spot price implementation. Therefore, analysis of their behavior is
particularly useful for evaluating conditions which are expected to
prevail during a transition period. The socially optimum investment
behavior does not coincide with individual participant profit-maximizing
behavior. Socially efficient behavior should satisfy the following
relationship:
Cost of Deviation of Participant j Participant j
Incremental = Spot and Pre- + Magnitude + Electricity
Investment by determined Prices Constraint Usage and
Participant j Related Term Related Gains Rationing Cost
Related Gains
(8)
The last two terms of eq. (8) are similar to those in eq. (7). The
second term involves predetermined rather than spot prices and the third
-- ---- Y
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includes the impact of incremiental investment on easing rationing costs.
The last two terms in (8) represent profit maximization investment
conditions. The first term is an additional impact of incremental
participant investment on social welfare which is not realized by
individual predetermined price participants. This term equals the
expectation of the difference between the spot and predetennined price
times the impact on demand of incremental investment. Recalling that the
social welfare maximizing predetermined price in eq. (5) equals the
expected value of the spot price plus a covariance term, socially
efficient investment can be shown to diverge from individual participant
profit maximizing investment and achieve different incremental investment
benefits. The difference in the incremental investment benefits is
proportional to the following two covariance terms: the covariance
between the spot price and demand response to incremental changes in the
predetermined price and the covariance between the spot price and demand
response to incremental investment. Depending on the particular
characteristics of each customer, the covariance terms may be positive or
negative, inducing higher or lower investment than is socially optimum.
Empirical investigation is necessary to determine the actual value of
these covariance terms for different customers (or groups of customers)
An appropriate subsidy policy can be subsequently designed to induce
socially optimal investment behavior by'predetermined price
participants. A final note concerns the fact that the value of the
covariance terms can be made as small as desired by increasing the
frequency with which predetermined prices are updated (every month or
every week rather than every year) as well as their differentiation by
time of use (different rates for each hour of the day as opposed to day
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and night rates only). The criterion for determining the optimal update
frequency and time differentiation is the trade-off between transaction,
metering and communications costs on the one hand and social welfare
gains on the other. Availability of a wide range of pricing options and
comparison of welfare gains with metering and communication costs
associated with shifting from one option to another may yield a socially
optimum process for assigning customers to pricing options. However,
individual participant self-selection of pricing options will not always
yield the socially efficient grouping described above.
2.5. Decentralized Operation and Investment
The theory of spot pricing was presented in Section 2.2 for a utility
which owns and operates the T and D system and all its generators. The
theory also applies to situations where independent competitors own and
operate a large amount of generation. Spot prices are calculated by the
same formulas as before, and act as signals to generators to adjust their
output levels in response to changing supply and demand conditions where
their internal thermal requirements will allow for it. If the
unconstrained generating firm is a perfect-price taker, full spot prices
lead it to self-dispatch exactly as if it were centrally owned. The
social value of a generation expansion for a given generating unit is
also the expected private profitability'of the expansion if the unit were
independently owned and paid optimal full spot prices at all times.
Thus, to a first approximation, competitive generating firms under full
spot pricing would behave as if owned by a welfare maximizing
monopolist. Thus full spot pricing can, at least in theory, replace
economies of scale due to unified ownership of generation.
lilk
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Naturally, to the extent that perfect competition by generators does
not exist in an electricity spot market, behavior of independent finIms
will deviate from social welfare maximizing behavior even if properly
calculated full spot prices are used. There are at least four plausible
deviations of a spot market from a perfectly competitive market.
o The remaining central utility has strong market power, even if it is
confined to calculating full spot prices and building and controlling
the T and D system. .lhile supply and demand forces will determine
prices at each instant, a central utility could reconfigure or
underbuild the T and D system to increase spatial price differences
and its net revenues. ,ithout regulatory auditing it can also simply
miscalculate prices, as long as it does so in a way which maintains
the energy balance constraint. This is not fundamentally different
from the basic regulatory revenue reconciliation problem of
controlling the behavior of a traditional utility using marginal cost
rates. Full spot pricing with decentralized ownership of generation
does not eliminate the need for regulating the owner of the T and D
system.
o Individual generating firms might own enough capacity in a region to
affect the system's marginal generating cost at certain times. This
type of market power is traditionally dealt with by antitrust action.
o Each generator or customer will have some spatial market power. The
magnitude of this effect depends on the strenjth of the T and D
system.
o Economies of scale in unit capital costs can lead to construction of
units large enough to affect local prices; private investors will
then size new units slightly below the social optimum. They will
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also retard construction of new units in the face of growing demand.
The above problems occur to some extent in many unregulated U.S.
markets which have lumpy investment and significant transport costs for
their products. But the feasibility and desirability of fully
decentralized ownership of electricity generation has other potential
problems, such as the need for accurate real-time competitive market
clearing. The purpose of the discussion here is mainly to point out the
possibility of a mixed system of central utility and competitive
ownership of generators, and the need to use full spot prices to achieve
efficient coordination in such a system.
2.6. The Revenue Reconciliation Problem
One concern in applying optimal spot pricing is satisfying the
regulatory imposed revenue requirement or profit constraint in an
efficient manner. The overall profit constraint is defined within a
standard cost accounting framework: gross revenues minus fixed and
variable costs should provide a fair return to equity capital. The fixed
cost includes depreciation of capital stock based upon historical
(embedded) costs and debt service. Variable costs include fuel and other
operating expenses. The revenue requirement framework is the primary
means for controlling the profits of public utilities. The revenue
reconciliation problem is further complicated by the traditional practice
of basing revenue requirements for separate customer classes on fully
distributed accounting costs. The procedures for allocating the
accounting costs of production to determine class revenue responsibility
have little relationship.to marginal cost pricing principles. Therefore,
revenues derived from marginal cost pricing for each individual customer
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class would lead to a relative shift in revenue responsibility among the
various customer classes. The distribution and magnitude of these
potential intra-class revenue impacts will be a concern of the customers.
These issues represent the major battle ground of today's regulatory
proceedings. While basing all rates on spot prices will in theory
eliminate these cross subsidies, the process of moving to spot price
based rates will raise the issue to the fore where it will cause a heated
debate.
The general problem of efficiently constraining prices to meet a
budget constraint has been vigorously debated in the economic
literature. Hot-elling's [1938] article considered the problem of
financing public works such as bridges where the marginal cost of
crossings are usually trivial. His answer to the pricing problem was to
set prices at marginal cost and to finance the fixed cost of the bridges
through taxes which (ostensibly) would not distort consumption decisions,
such as income taxes or inheritance taxes. Coase [1946, 1970] argued
that from a broad public policy perspective, user support was an
important market test for efficient allocation of resources and thus fees
should cover the total cost of the enterprise. He suggested the use of
multi-part tariffs (such as declining block rates or a fixed fee plus a
commodity charge) as an alternative to government subsidies. Vickery
[1955] stressed that a misallocation of resources can result if marginal
cost pricing principles are not followed. Baumol and Bradford [1970]
proposed optimal departures from marginal cost pricing with a
generalization of Ramsey's [1927] rule. A much discussed special result
of their analysis is the "inverse elasticity rule."
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If the cross price ellasticities of demand between the
commodities in question are zero, then the percentage deviations
in price from marginal costs should vary in inverse proportion
with the own price elasticity of demand.
If cross elasticities are not zero, a somewhat analogous rule still
holds. Relative TOU prices can be adjusted according to the Ramsey rule
if sufficient information is known about price elasticities. More
recently proposals for non-linear pricing or multipart tariffs (see e.g.,
4illig [1978)) have been suggested to be Pareto superior to the Baumol
and Bradford rules.
One possible "nonlinear" pricing scheme would be a two-part tariff
where the commodity charge is set equal to marginal costs and the fixed
charge is set to assure revenue requirement recovery. A problem with
such two-part tariffs is that the fixed fee can fall disproportionately
on smaller customers. If, however, the fixed fee is set in strict
proportion to the current consumption for purposes of equitably
allocating the deficit, the effect is a proportional increase in the
conodity charge. This is undesirable on efficiency grounds because
marginal prices will then not reflect marginal cost levels. Benchmark
tariffs which appear implementable can provide a method of. allocating
fixed fees proportional to consumption yet retaining marginal costs as
the basis for pricing marginal consumption. (See Davidson and Dent
[1978] for further discussion and references.) The thrust of the
procedure is to tie the fee to a benchmark of historical consumption.
All current consumption then is priced at marginal costs. Should the
resulting revenue fail to meet the revenue requirement, the difference is
made up by a fee set in proportion to the benchmark level of
consumption. The benchmark can be fixed, having no effect on marginal
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prices, or it can be a moving average of past consumption, which will
have a discounted effect on marginal prices for current consumption.
!4hen the fee is positive, firms with decreasing consumption (due to, for
example, conservation measures) will find part of their bill still tied
to historical levels of consumption; hence the bill reductions of
conservation will not be as great as they would be if the electricity had
a uniform price. The equity gains of this pricing system over a uniform
fixed fee, however, may be persuasive if a uniform fixed fee would be
substantial for small users. The choice among the various reconciliation
procedures will depend, in practice, upon the magnitude of the problem.
If the problem is relatively small the redistribution positive or
negative will be unnoticeable in the total rate virtually regardless of
method chosen. If the proportion is great the impact will be great
thereby requiring far greater care in reconciliation so as to maintain
the goals of efficiency in pricing.
Spot pricing would be a major change in tariff structure. As such,
its revenue implications cannot be as confidently estimated as has been
the case for traditional rate designs, because of uncertainties about
customers' response and resulting consumption patterns. T.o minimize the
potential for adverse revenue effects due to incorrect consumption
forecasts on either the utility or the Spot Pricing customer class, it
may be desirable to allow for ex post adjustment in bills.
Under traditional utility cost distribution procedures, class revenue
requirements are set to "fairly" allocate the fixed and variable costs of
service among the various classes. Should these procedures be continued,
a special class would have to be created for spot price customers. The
revenue requirement for that class could be set as is done presently,
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with two important considerations. First, since spot price customers
will receive more accurate cost information in their prices than will
other customers, their consumption patterns could be expected to adjust
to lower the variable costs of service for them. Presumably at least a
portion of these savings should be passed back to the spot price
customers by lowering their revenue requirements. Because this reduction
would be directly attributable to lower variable costs, all other
classes, as well as the utility, would be no worse off. The existence of
a spot price class would provide reliability benefits as well, in much
the same way as do industrial interruptible customers and residential
customers subject to direct load control. In the long run, this
increased reliability would allow lower capacity requirements for the
utilities. For the spot price customers, this long-run benefit may be
recognized by lowering the fixed costs ascribed to their revenue
requirement.
2.7. Comparison of Spot Pricing with Other Public Utility Pricing Models
2.7.A) Introduction
The idea of setting electricity prices .on a spot price basis is quite
old. It has been used for sales between utilities in the U.S. under the
name "economy interchange." Pricing methods containing elements of spot
pricing have been implemented for sales-to customers on a limited basis
by many utilities in the U.S. and Europe.
o Sweden has a complex rate structure for its largest industrial
customers which contains many provisions analogous to spot
pricing (Camm, 1980).
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o Great Britain adds a price surcharge during periods of
anticipated supply shortfalls, or "peak period warnings." This
rate is applied to several hundred large customers (Ilitchell,
Manning and Acton, 1979).
o San Diego Gas and Electric Company calculates a demand charge
for its 23 largest customers based on their demand at the time
of system peak. This can be interpreted as a spot price (Bohn,
1980, Gorzelnik, 1979).
The desirability of time of use rates has been the topic of major
research by the Electric Power Research Institute [1979]. For a good
summary of this effort and discussions of associated problems, see falko
and Faruqui [1980] and Faruqui and Ilalko [1981a]. For a good review of
the U.S. Department of Energy sponsored residential time of use
experiments, see Faruqui and Malko [1981b].
Although rates which are effectively spot prices have been in use for
some time, the academic literature on spot pricing theory for electricity
is less well developed. There is, however, a rich literature on optimal
pricing and generation planning for electricity, but it emphasizes
predetermined prices ("time-of-day" pricing), or direct utility load
control ("load management").
The idea of time differentiated prices goes back at least to Boiteux
(1949) (see also Vickrey [1955] and Steiner [1957]). Until Brown and
Johnson [1969] the models were purely static and deterministic. During
the 1970's various authors presented prescriptions for time-of-use
pricing in static models with demand uncertainty. Their analysis can be
considerably simplified and generalized by using the concept of spot
pricing.
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2.7.B) Time of Use Pricing
The "standard" time-of-use pricing models are surveyed in Gellerson
and Grosskopf [1980] and Crew and Kleindorfer [1979]. They include
Wenders [1976], Crew and Kleindorfer [1976, 1979 Ch. 4 and 5], Turvey and
Anderson [1977, Ch. 14], and various predecessors. These models include
multiple types of generators and stochastic demand. Some of the
limitations of these models are as follows:
o Generating unit availability is modeled by simply derating unit
sizes at all times. This fails properly to penalize large
units, and it gives inaccurate estimates of the probability that
rationing will be needed. It also gives no guidance for how to
evaluate new technologies such as solar and cogeneration, whose
"availabilities" are correlated with demands by other customers.
o There is no analysis of how or when prices should be
recalculated. These models rule out frequent recalculations (by
spot pricing) by assumption. By assuming infinitely repetitive
demand cycles and stable factor prices they show no need for
annual or less frequent recalculations. Demand and cost trends
are thus not considered.
o These models treat all investment as occurring at once.
Investment is really a sequential process. True utilities never
have the static optimal capital stock of these models, because
conditions change more rapidly than capital stock turns over.
Therefore pricing equations which asume optimal capital stock,
i.e. assume that short run and long run marginal costs are
equal, have limited practical value. In fact long run marginal
costs can only be calculated conditional on a particular
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scenario or probability distribution of demand and factor
prices. This problem is addressed by Ellis [1981].
o The models assume that demands and generating costs are
independent from one hour to another. This is very convenient,
since it allows the use of a single load duration curve (or
price duration curve). Nonetheless the availability of storage
[Nguyen, 1976] or demand rescheduling can have a major impact on
optimal prices and investment policies.
o The models ignore transmission, which is equivalent to assuming
an infinitely strong transmission system. This is not feasible
when setting practical rates for power buybacks, but these
models give no insight into how to price over space. Current
debates about "wheeling tariffs" indicate the importance of this
issue when trying to encourage independent generation by firms
located in the territory of a monopolistic utility.
o The models do not use the device of prices which depend on the
operating condition of the utility. Therefore, the investment
conditions derived in the models are hard to interpret, although
they are correct (given the limiting assumptions 'above). For
example, Crew and Kleindorfer [1979, p. 77] interpret their
results only for the case of interchanging units which are
adjacent in the loading order. Littlechild [1972] showed the
way out of this problem, but his point was apparently missed by
subsequent authors.
2.7.C) Dynamic Pricing/Investment Models
Several authors present deterministic explicitly dynamic models which
can be interpreted as deterministic versions of spot pricing. Crew and
-
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Kleindorfer [1979, Ch. 7] give a continuous time optimal control model
with one type of capital. They get the result that:
Whatever the level of capacity, price is to be set to maximize
instantaneous [short run] welfare returns subject to the given
capacity restriction. [p 113) [That is,] price should equal SRiIC.
Of course, at optimum capital stock is adjusted so as to equate SRMC
and LRMC....In the event of .... a fall in demand, [optimal] price is
less than LRMC, then capacity would be allowed to decline until
equality between price and LRMC were re-established.
They are thinking here on a time scale of years, not hours; they reject
continuous adjustment of prices to reflect the actual level of demand.
Nonetheless, their model can be interpreted in terms of hourly price
adjustments.
Turvey and Anderson [1978, Ch. 17] have a discrete time dynamic model
which leads to discontinuous prices, as capital investment is made in
lumps. However they reject this approach: "It is apparent that, for one
reason or another, such fluctuations are unacceptable." They also
acknowledge that investment decisions must be made before price
decisions, and with more uncertainty about future demands, but they do
not incorporate this into their models. [p 305]
Ellis [1981] explicitly models sequential investment and pricing
decisions. He concludes that "...welfare optimal pricing rules differ
according to whether prices must be set either before or after investment
decisions are made." [p 2] He uses dynamic programming to look at how the
character of optimal sequential investment depends on capital stock
irreversibility and the sequential revelation of information about future
demands.
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2.7.D) Spatial Pricing
Several previous authors have studied how public utility prices
should vary over space. Relevant models include Takayama and Judge
[1971] (which was not directed at electricity), Craven [1974], Dansby
[1980], Scherer [1976, 1977], and Schuler and Hobbs [1931]. All of these
models are deterministic and most are static. Only Scherer has an
accurate model of electricity line losses and line constraints, or
includes T and D investnent options.
Scherer's approach is to use a mixed integer programming model of an
electricity generation and transmission network. In his model spatially
distinct prices appear as dual variables on demand at each point in the
network. In his numerical case study he found that prices between
different points at the same time varied by up to 30 percent. The
absolute and percentage variations across space changed over time.
[1977, p. 265] He does not discuss these results, but presumably they
reflect the different losses resulting from different optimal load flows
at each level of total system demand.
Much of Takayama and Judge concerns pricing across space. They
consider only competitive markets, but use an explicit optimization
method of finding equilibrium, so their analysis is equally applicable to
a welfare maximizing monopolist. They assume a constant transport cost
per unit between two points, no transport capacity limit, and no losses.
This makes their models more appropriate for conventional commodities
than for public utility products such as electricity. They also assume
linear demand and supply functions. But their framework does provide
insights into more general spatial and temporal pricing problems. For
example they discuss "no arbitrage" conditions which bound the price
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differences between different locations.[1971, p 405] Their models do
not include capital, so they provide no insights into optimal investments
in transport facilities.
2.7.E) Pricing of Reliability
One way to view spot pricing is that it allows customers to choose
their own reliability levels. Marchand [1974] has a model in which
customers select and pay for different reliability. The utility
allocates shortages accordingly, when curtailment is necessary. His
approach differs from (and is, except for transactions costs, inferior
to) spot pricing because customers must contract in advance, and
therefore have no real time control over their level of service. Also,
customers not curtailed by the utility have no incentive to adjust
demands.
A simple version of flarchand's proposal is in use in the U.S. and
elsewhere. Called "direct load control", it involves the utility turning
off specific equipment of the customer's. Despite its increasing use
[Norgan and Talukdar, 1979; Gorzelnik, 1982] optimal pricing and use of
direct load control has not been extensively studied by economists.
(Note, however, Berg [1981] and Dams [1979).)
2.7.F) Spot Pricing
Spot pricing of public utility services was first proposed by
Vickrey, under the name "responsive pricing". His original article
[1971] presented a general discussion using as examples mainly long
distance telephones and airlines. The emphasis is on curtailment premia,
rather than on marginal production cost changes over time. Later
manuscripts on electricity develop the ideas in more detail, including
some discussion of optimal investment criteria [Vickrey, 1973 p 12],
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metering requireients and designs, pricing of reactive energy, and short
run marginal operating costs (system lambda). He proposes that utilities
be free to set prices however they want over time, subject only to limits
on total profits.
Vickrey's essential insight 'was that prices can be set after some
random variables are observed, and optimal prices should reflect this.
Since his original article different versions of this basic idea have
been developed independently and under different names, with varying
levels of rigor. These include:
o "State preference" approach to pricing electricity [Littlechild,
1972], a formal stochastic model of both pricing and investment under
static conditions. Both operating costs and capacity constraints are
modeled, but with homogeneous fixed coefficient technology, i.e.,
only one kind of capital.
o "Time varying congestion tolls" for a highway or communications
network. [Agnew, 1973; 1977] A formal deterministic optimal control
model incorporating only capacity constraints and delays. No
discussion of investment.
o "Spot pricing" of electricity. [Schweppe, 1978; Schweppe et al.
1980, 1978; Bohn et al., 1981; Caramanis et al. 1982].
o "Real time pricing" of electricity. [Rand, 1979] Informal; no
specific proposal.
o "Load adaptive pricing" of electricity. [Luh et al, 1982] A game
theoretic model; nonlinear prices allowed. Quadratic production
costs assumed, with no capacity constraints and no investment. Their
formulation allows for games between one utility and one consumer
which is not a pure price taker.
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o "Flexible pricing" of electricity. [Kepner and Reinbergs, 1980]
Informal.
Many other authors have explicitly rejected the idea that prices can
be set after events are revealed. For example, Crew and Kleindorfer
[1980, p 55] write: "For the case of the regulator setting the price ex
post, he or she would either have to allow a market-clearing price or
have some deliberate arrangement for setting the price above or below the
market clearing price. Iere the regulator [to allow] the market clearing
price, he would, in effect, be giving up his right to regulate price."
Turvey and Anderson [1977, p 2983 are even more adamant in their
rejection of spot pricing:
...for a wide. class of random disturbances (but not
for all), it is not possible to respond to the resultant
random excess or shortage of capacity by adjusting
prices. Failure of a generating plant on Thursday
cannot be followed by a higher price on Friday, and the
price in January cannot be raised when it becomes
apparent that January is colder than usual. Even though
telecontrol makes the necessary metering technically
possible, it would be expensive, and... there would be
difficulties in informing consumers of the new price.
It would also be scarcely possible'to estimate its
market clearing level. Sudden and random price
fluctuations would in any case impose considerable costs
and irritations on consumers. Hence responsive pricing
that always restrains demand to capacity is not
practical, and some interruptions are thus desirable.
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Their rejection thus appears to be based on the belief that the
transactions costs of spot pricing would outweigh any possible
benefits.
2.8. Summary
This chapter has developed the logic of spot pricing and covered
in detail a significant number of ancillary issues ranging from
independent generation to revenue reconciliation. In addition it has
presented a review of much of the literature which has developed over
the past two decades which has pointed either positively or negatively
toward the potential for pricing of electric energy which reflects
more accurately the time varying costs of generation. There are two
major conclusions to be drawn from the theoretical develoments. The
discussions of ancillary issues and the review of the literature.
These are the advantages of spot pricing and the benefit/cost issues
on implementation.
Looking only at the theoretical discussion presented in the early
portions of this chapter there is little argument that can be raised
against spot pricing being the economically and thereby physically
efficient approach to pricing of electric energy. The ability of the
customer to choose his level of service via the price signal and
thereby his level of reliability is critical in the operation of an
efficient marketplace. The ability of spot pricing to act
symetrically between purchase and sale of energy offers another major
advantage. The advent of PURPA has had an impact on the already
difficult issue of setting prices for utility buyback of energy from
small and cogenerators. Spot pricing provides both the theory and the
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practical means of setting and maintaining those prices.
The second issue is that of implementability and the critical
relationship between the benefits from increasingly short spot price
update cycles and the costs of communications, metering and control.
It is clear that a number of writers who recognized the potential for
spot prices did so at a time when it could not be implemented because
of major hardware limitations. It is also clear that writers such as
Turvey have rejected, a priori, the concepts of spot pricing because
they. believed that the costs would exceed the benefits. The arguments
made in this report, specifically in the next two chapters, indicate
that the benefits from spot pricing are more than sufficient to
justify from a societal perspective the investment, for at least large
customers, in the communications, metering and control equipment.
Given lower cost energy control and management capabilities, the major
issue is which of the spot pricing time cycles will be appropriate to
which individual customer or customer class. It appears that
industrial customers will find this an attractive alternative with
advantages beyond the current time of use rates. Large commercial
customers are also likely to be able to take advantage of the short
time periods. Smaller custmers will benefit from slower time cycles.
The analysis of the benefits from response will determine in large
part the economic advantage from participation. These issues will
require empircal effort beyond the simple benefit analysis discussed
in the two following chapters.
_ I_ I *~1 _ ~___ ~_ II _I___
3-1
CHAPTER 3
FRAME'fORK FOR INUSTRIAL CUSTO2,ER/UTILITY BEEFIT ANIALYSIS
3.1 Introduction and Simulation Model Overview
The objective of this chapter is to present the background and
modeling structure for an analysis of the potential benefits from spot
pricing applied to the industrial sector in the prototype .lisconsin
utility. The previous chapter presented the theoretical arguments for
spot pricinj. This chapter presents the analytic structure and Chapter 4
which follows presents the results of the initial model analysis.
The analysis presented focusses on the following set of questions:
- 'hat are the levels of likely benefits from spot pricing
implementation
- How do benefits compare to costs of metering and communications
required for spot pricing implementation
- How are the benefits of spot price implementation likely to be
distributed among consumers and generators of electricity
- How does the ability to respond affect benefits and their
distribution among consumers and generators
- How does the type of available generating capacity and fuel mix
affect benefits and their distribution
- Does the existing generating capacity stock deviate substantially
from the optimal composition under spot pricing If so, in what
types of generation has there been overinvestment or underinvestment
A simulation model was used to address these questions. Customer and
utility operating data were obtained from Wisconsin Electric Power
Company (,IEPCO). The generating system's performance and cost
characteristics, actual time-of-use rates and hourly demand levels for
I__
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1980 were used. Energy purchases from neighboring utilities were not
considered. (The contracts under which economy transactions were made in
1980 are not anticipated to hold during future years.) Large industrial
customers accounting for approximately one-fourth of total demand, were
selected as the most suitable candidates for spot pricing. Their demand
behavior as a function of spot prices was simulated under assumptions of
high and low responsiveness. The demand response algorithm was imbedded
in an hourly Monte Carlo simulation production costing model in order to
investigate the interaction of demand response and marginal generating
costs. The overall structure of the simulation model is presented in
Figure 3.1 and its components, input data and results described later.
The following quantities of interest are estimated by the simulation
model.
- Variable generating costs
- Total energy generated
- Reliability in terms of unserved energy and loss of load hours
- Fuel consumption by fuel type
- Energy demanded by industrial customers
- Changes in industrial production cost (electricity) under spot
pricing compared to the costs incurred under the present pricing
practice
- Generating unit-specific variable operating costs
- Value of electricity supplied by each generator weighted by the spot
price.
The above quantities allow calculation of spot pricing benefits and
their distribution among participants (generators and consumers). The
difference between the value of electricity (supplied by a particular
__III 11 ~IIII I YY I M Eli m
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unit) and its generating costs are a measure of the unit's contribution
to social welfare. If that contribution exceeds the fixed costs (3+I and
capital) of building and operating an additional unit of that type, it is
an indication of underinvestment in that type of generting capacity.
Excess of fixed costs, on the other hand, is an indication of
overi nvestment.
A number of simulations were carried out corresponding to different
scenarios representing variations over total demand level, industrial
consumer type and level of response, and finally different generating
unit fuel costs.* The overall simulation model presented in Figure 3.1
consists of the following steps:
Step 1 - Input data on:
- Hourly industrial demand (HID) and hourly non-industrial demand
(HNID) observed in 1980 with the present (time-of-day) pricing
practice.
- Generating system characteristics, operating costs, etc.
- Demand response assumptions and values of parameters of demand
response algorithm.
Step 2 - Set HID and HNID equal to observed values.
Step 3 - Simulate generating unit outages for a 24-hour period and
perform production costing to meet hourly demand. Calculate
hourly marginal generating costs (system lambda) and available
spinning reserves.
*The 'IEPCO generating unit fuel costs were modified in some of the
simulations to model a system more heavily dependent on oil than the
actual '4EPCO system.
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Step 4 - Calculate hourly spot prices as a function of hourly marginal
generating costs (system larih!Ia) and available spinning reserves.
Step 5 - Check for convergence. If all 24-hourly spot prices are equal
to the prices (spot or TOD if in the first loop) corresponding
to the values of HID used then:
- Calculate aggregate industrial consumption electricity bill
under the constant total consumption assumption.
- Calculate aggregate industrial consumers' surplus (relative
to TOD prices) under the constant expenditure share-
assumption.
- Calculate social value of electricity supplied by each
generating unit weighting supply by spot prices.
- Proceed to next 24-hour period (Step 3) until all days of
the year are exhausted.
If one or more hourly spot prices differ from those
corresponding to the HID used, then proceed to Step 6.
Step 6 - Simulate HID corresponding to hourly spot prices calculated in
Step 5. The simulated HID values are estimated by the demand
response algorithm as a function of response assumptions and
parameter values, TOD rates, the observed HID values, and the
spot prices from Step 5.
Step 7 - Revise HID values to those simulated in Step 6 and go to Step 3.
The simulation algorithm described above was used to generate the
results presented here. Due to the computational burden involved,
however, the number of loops used for convergence was limited to a
maximum of two. As expected, convergence problems were more noticeable
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when high response parameters were specified.
The remainder of this chapter presents the details of the
algorithms that made up the simulation model and the data and assumptions
used in the analyses.
3.2 The Pricing Algorithm
The optimal pricing rule developed in Chapter 2 and Caramanis et
al. [1982) provides the specifications for real-time price setting based
on marginal system operating costs, energy balance (market clearing) and
transmission and distribution (T+D) network constraints, as well as
participant-specific incremental impacts on system losses.
In the simulations reported here, however, losses and T+D-related
components of the optimal spot price were not included. To include them
would have required solving an optimal load flow problem for each hour, a
practical impossibility given the available resources. In addition, the
energy balance (market clearing) constraint is not always met by the
initial choice of spot prices.* The initial choice of the spot prices is
a guess at the price that results in supply matching demand without
violating the spinning reserve requirements. Demand is determined as a
function of the previous guess of the spot price. In equation terms we
have:
*In terms of the discussion of Chapter 2, the spot price used in this
modeling effort includes only variable operating costs and quality of
supply, not T and D, losses or transaction costs.
- --~---^ " In
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k-1
x = ICt(t ) + t if x < 1.5
P =t -
1.5 otherwi se
0 if D -(Gma - SRt) < 0
(t - t [m
($ - MCt)[D- - (Gmax - SR t)]/SRt otherwise
whe re:
Pk" kth spot price guess for hour t; t = 1, 2, ... , 24
2-1Dk-. Demand at hour t derived in tenms of the k-1 spot price
t
guess.
MCt: The marginal generating cost (system lambda) during hour
t given forced outages and demand equal to Dk-1 or
Gmax, whichever is smaller.
t
Ut: Quality of supply premium during hour t. It is zero
when available generation exceeds"demind plus spinning
reserve requirements.
SRt:  Spinning reserve requirements at hour t.
Gmax Maximum available generation/purchase for hour t.t
The above specification which is consistent with the discussion in
Chapter 2 provides the means for a successive approximation of the
optimal spot price which converges to the optimum market clearing level
for a sufficient number of iterations. It can be interpreted as
follows: the spot price is set equal to marginal generating costs as
long as enough generation is available to meet demand plus spinning
reserve requirements. 4henever demand plus spinning reserve requirements
exceed available generation, a quality of supply premium is added to the
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spot price. The premium is a linear function of the difference between
available generation and demand plus spinning reserve requirements. Then
demand exceeds available generation minus spinning reserves the spot
price increases beyond the marginal cost as a linear funtion of demand.
It attains the value of $1/KwH when demand equals available generation
driving spinning reserves to zero and continues to increase with demand
to a maximum value of $1.50/KwH. It has been assumed that at this price,
i.e. 51.50, that non spot price customers would be shed from the system.
Figure 3.2 shows graphically the trajectory in price that would be
calculated in the model. It should be noted that the total system
capacity and the reserve margin are a function of the availability of
generating plants and therefore are not constant for the prototype
utility. The precise values for quality of supply and the point at which
non spot price customers would be shed from the system would, in practice
be set from empirical data gathered from experience in operating the
system. The values chosen in this study are based on limited information
concerning the costs associated with shortage and with addition of
additional peaking capacity. These numbers must be seen as first
approximations for the purpose of this analysis and not as either
estimates of the cost of capacity on the "lissconsin system or of the
measured value of energy to Wisconsin industrial customers.
Figure 3.3 shows an example of 42 daily price trajectories for the
system being studied. As can be seen, the price on lone day did reach
the $1.00 per KwH though once again it msut be pointed out that the
system evaluated was not assumed to have intertie power available.
-- --- -- 
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Figure 3.2
EXAMPLES OF HOURLY SPOT PRICE TRAJECTORIES
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3.3 The demand Response and Consumer Surplus Estimation Algorithms
The demand response algorithm used in the simulation 'model yields
aggregate hourly industrial demand profiles over a 24-hour period. These
profiles are derived as functions of actual aggregate hourly industrial
demand profiles observed during 1980 under time-of-day prices. The
actual profiles are first modified for the effect of spot prices on
"shutdo.in loads." Shutdown loads are small portions of total demand
which can be dropped at tines of high prices (for example, reduction in
lighting). Table 3.1 gives the parameter values used for modeling
shutdown load. After shutdown loads have been removed, the remaining
demand is rescheduled to reflect shifts in consumption due to spot prices
varyin3 over time. This rescheduling is done by employing the demand
response algorithm.
The parameters of the demand response algorithm are calibrated to
meet the following conditions:
a. When prices equal their 1980 TOD values, then the demand
response algorithm should yield the observed electricity hourly
demands after shutdown and the exogenously specified cross
elasticities of substitution between electricity consumed at
different hours of the day.
b. The total consumption of electricity over any 24-hour period
starting at 12 pm should be invariant to the actual trajectory
of spot prices during the same period.
It should be noted that condition (a) specifies cross-price
elasticities of demand, while condition (b) specifies by a residual
method own-price elasticities of substitution that satisfy the "constant
consumption" assumption. The own-price elasticities of substitution
--~-~----~IIYYLIIIIUI ii
3-12
Table 3.1
Shutdown Load Parameters Used
xl
0
1.2
2.0
4.0
6.0
10.0
14.0
20.0
50.0
70.0
100.0
x2
1.2
2.0
4.0
6.0
10.0
14.0
20.0
50.0
70.0
100.0
100.0
Reduction
0
.01
.02
.03
.05
.10
.12
.14
.20
.30
.50
Note: Shutdown load is simulated as follows: If spot price is less than
x2 times TOD price but more than xI times TOD price, then shutdown
load equals reduction times original demand.
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obtained in this fashion are very close to zero. The "constant
consumption" assumption is quite restrictive since it forces total
consumption to remain the same over a daily rather than over a weekly,
monthly, or yearly period which may be a more realistic requirement. It
is used, however, as a very conservative model of reality aimed at
producing lower bounds of potential benefits.
Consumer surplus estimates are obtained by specifying a minimum cost
function for the aggregate industrial production. The minimum cost
function is specified in terms of factor input prices and the industrial
output level. The prices of factor inputs other than electricity and the
industrial output level are assumed to be invariant to changes in the
price of electricity. The parameters of the minimum cost function are
selected so that they satisfy the following conditions:
a. When prices equal their 1980 TOD values, then the minimum cost
function should yield the observed 1980 factor input cost shares
and the exogenously specified cross-elasticities of substitution.
b. The total production cost share of expenditure for electricity
over any 24-hour period starting at 12:00 pm should be invariant
to the actual trajectory of spot prices during the same period.
It should be noted that condition (a) specifies cross-price
elasticities of demand which are equal to those in the demand response
algorithm. Condition (b) specifies by a residual method own-price
elasticities of demand which are consistent with the "constant
expenditure" assumption. The own-price elasticities thus defined are
substantially larger than those in the demand response algorithm and
their magnitude is close .to unity.
x '-moll
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The "constant expenditure" assumption used in obtaining consumer
surplus estimates represents a much more optimistic assessment of
customer response capabilities than was used in the demand response
algorithm. The constant expenditure assumption implies a unitary
cross-elasticity of substitution between electricity and other factor
inputs which is characteristic of a Cobb-Douglas production function
relationship. Studies of U.S. manufacturing (3erndt and Jood [19793)
have shown short-run cross-elasticities of substituion between energy and
capital to be very small or negative, while between energy and labor they
are large and positive. Given the nature of the behavior simulated here
and the fact that short-term own-elasticity of demand for energy is
generally observed to be smaller than unity*, the constant expenditure
assumption should be interpreted as optimistic and the consumer surplus
estimates obtained as upper bounds.
The algebraic structure and parameter calibration of the demand
response and consumer surplus algorithms are presented below:
The algebraic form of the demand response algorith is the following:
D. = D*[Dt + b.. In(PS /PPj)]3J
where:
i,j: indices spanning the 24-hour period, 1, 2, ... , 24
Di : rescheduled demand in hour i
D*i: observed demand during hour i
D*: total observed demand over 24-hour period
PSj: the spot price during hour j
*Although long-term estimates are very close to unity (see Pindyck
and Rotemberg [1982]).
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PPj: the time-of-day pricing during hour j
bij: parameters to be calibrated.
Estimation of spot prices PSj follows the pricing algorithm
procedure presented previously. The time-of-day prices PP. are
obtained from the 1980 energy and demand charges for industrial customers
by using the relationships:
DEMiANJD CHARGEPP = ENERGY CHARGE + DEuA-IJD CHARGEk E GCA LOAD FACTOR * HOURS
PP1 = ENERGY CHARGE
where
k: index of hours during the on-peak period
1: index of hours during the off-peak period
LOAD FACTOR: the monthly load factor during the on-peak period
HOURS: the number of hours during a month that comprise the
on-peak period.
The above relationships convert the present two-part tariff into a
related one-part tariff which varies between on-peak and off-peak
periods. Since the demand charge varies between summer and winter months
and the load factor varies from month to month, the PP. values also
vary from month to month. Table 3.3 presents the determinants of PPj
in the various scenarios considered.
The values of the parameters bij are calibrated as follows:
b ij . (Dt/D*)(PPi . Dt/C) for i i j
-ij b k for i = j
k/j j
-- '~~Yllllllllilll Li
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where
oij: The cross-elasticities of substitution, an exogenous input
C: The total cost of industrial production over the 24-hour
period.
Note that the off-diagonal elements of the parameter matrix bij (i,j
1, 2, ... , 24) are calculated first. The diagonal elements are then
calculated by the residual method so that the "constant consumption"
assumption requiring bij = 0 for all j, is satisfied. It should
i
also be noted that the price elasticities of demand denoted by cij are:
e.. = b. (0*/D ) for all i,j
The cross-elasticities (ij) are related to the exogenously specified
i... Substituting the definition of b.. for i f j in the equation
above we have:
C.i = . .(C/PP. . D ) for i f j
The consumer surplus estimates are based on the specification of a
minimum cost relationship expressed as a function of hourly prices and
total industrial output. The minimum cost function is defined as the
solution of the optimization problem
min C = PiXi
xi  i
subject to Q(Xi; i = 1, 2, ... , T + M) >
where
i: index of factor inputs (i = 1, 2., ... , T, T+1, .... ,
T+H) with T = 24. Values between 1 and 24 refer to
electricity consumed during each hour of the day while
values larger than 24 refer to other factor inputs.
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Xi' Pi: Factor input i and its price respectively.
Q(Xi; i = 1, 2, ... , T+MM): production function relating factor
input utilization to output level
IT: desired production level.
The solution to the above minimization problem must satisfy T+ M
first-order conditions on the Xi's. These conditions can be used to
express the solution in terms of the output level " and the factor input
prices. The minimum cost function thus obtained can be approximated by a
second-order Taylor expansion after a logarithmic transformation of
variables, known as the translog cost function form (Christensen et al.
[1973]). Denoting the minimum cost function by C* we have:
InC* = +  Vq In + ailn(Pi) + ailn(Pi)ln(P)i 0 j 1
+ x aiQln(P )ln(Q) + aQQ(ln Q)21
Noting that the prices for i,j larger than 24 do not change and that the
constant total electricity expenditure share implies* a = 0 for iij,
i > 24 and j < 24, it can be shown that
C*(PP.; j = 1, ... , 24) - C*(PSj; j = 1, ... , 24) =
Consumer surplus change when going from present prices (TOD) to
spot prices
= C . [I - e]
where
C: total cost of production under TOD prices (taken to be
approximately 100 times the 1980 observed electricity
expenditure over each 24-hour period
*This can be easily seen if the derivatives with respect to the
logarithm of prices is taken yielding expenditure share equations.
ft I i I J I
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and
A aln(Pj) + - aijln(Pi)ln(Pj) for i,j = 1, 2, ... , 24.
j 1 J
The parameters used in estimating A are calibrated as
a : PP.D./C
if i i jS( i j - 1)(PPDj/C)(PP D /C)
aij
Note that
estimated
residual
requiring
- akj i i = j
kkj
t the off-diagonal elements of the parameter matrix aij are
first. The diagonal elements are then calculated by the
method so that the "constant expenditure" share assumption
Saij = 0 for all j is satisfied. To compare the consumer
i I l
surplus calculations to the demand response algorithm it should be noted
that cross-elasticities of demand and substitution are identical when
prices equal their TOD levels. The own-price elasticity of demand
however given in the context of the minimum cost function by
cii = a i - 1 + aii/a i
are significantly different and larger in magnitude than those in the
demand response algorithm.
3.4. The Production Cost and Reliability Algorithm
The proper simulation of the costs and benefits of spot pricing
requires a detailed production cost and reliability model. Since demand
response under spot pricing depends on the hour-by-hour prices over a
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daily cycle, a consecutive hour-by-hour production cost and reliability
analysis is required.
The ENPRO production cost model was used in this analysis. This
model does an hour-by-hour simulation of each day for each week of the
year. It is an hourly load following program as opposed to a program
that dispatches load along the load duration curve.
EIPRO allows for a detailed specification of each generating unit
including:
1. Changing heat rates with level of output.
2. Variable operating and maintenance costs.
3. Fixed operating and maintenance costs.
4. Fuel costs.
5. Forced outage rates.
6. Maintenance requirements.
7. Minimum load requirements.
8. Variable maximum output by hour of the day.
9. Seasonal deratings.
10. Contribution to spinning reserve.
ENPRO has been interfaced with the pricing algorithm, the demand response
algorithm and the consumer surplus estimation algorithm described above.
It has thus incorporated the essential functions for modeling spot
pricing response and the resulting benefits.
Production costing and reliability calculations are based on Nlonte
Carlo simulation techniques. The availability of any unit for a
particular day for a particular Monte Carlo iteration is based on a
"draw" from a random number set. Using this technique, the performance
of the generation system for a given day is calculated repeatedly for the
.----rrrrr~II~IIIYI YIIIIIIIIYIIYIIIIIYI  illlil
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specified number of iterations (eight in this case). The individual
hourly results are then summed to provide the expected value results.
Such an approach is particularly useful when looking at spot pricing
since unusual combinations of unit forced outages and load levels are
examined explicitly.
The output of the model includes a detailed summary of system
reliability. Annual hours of capacity deficiencies and the number of
capacity deficiencies by hour of the day by month are an output from the
model. In addition, the magnitude of the capacity deficiencies (unserved
energy) are calculated by hour of the day and by month and are summed
over the period of analysis.
Detailed output is also provided for system cost and fuel use. Cost
and energy output data are tabulated on a unit-by-unit basis. Fuel usage
by type is also calculated.
3.5 The Data Used
The data used in the simulations consist of hourly demands of .JEPCO
industrial and non-industrial consumers during 1980, industrial
time-of-day rates, demand response parameters, and generating system
characteristics.
The peak and energy values of demand used are given in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2
GENERAL DE;IAND CHARACTERISTICS
Low Demand Scenario High Demand Scenario
Customer Group Peak i41 Energy G'4H Peak 't Energy Cl4H
Industrial 787 5010 826 5257
tlon-Industrial 2496 13164 2621 13824
All 3283 18174 3447 19081
3-21
The low deinand scenario coincides with the actual 1980 observations while
the high demand scenario was constructed by increasing each hourly demand
by 5 percent.
The time-of-day rates used for the low demand :IEPCO case were these
in effect on October 9, 1980. The energy charges were adjusted to
reflect additional fuel costs in the cases of high demand and modified
system. The resulting TOD rate components are presented in Table 3.3.
On-peak hours include 8 am to 8 pm ;onday to Friday while off-peak hours
make up the rest. Summer months include July to October and winter
months ifovember to June.
The demand response parameters for the medium and low response
scenarios are given in Tables B.1 and 8.2 in Appendix 3.
The cross-elasticities of substitution presented in Tables 3.1 and
3.2 were not derived by rigorous statistical estimation due to the
limited resources available. They were specified using judgment and
qualitative information obtained in a limited number of interviews with
selected customers in the :IEPCO service territory. The overall structure
represented by the values specified implies the following:
- It is easiest to reschedule electricity consumption between
hours in the same shift.
- It is hardest to reschedule electricity consumption from the day
shift to either the night or evening shift because of employment
constraints.
- It is easier to reschedule electricity consumption from the
night or evening shifts to the day shift than it is to
reschedule from the evening to the night shift or vice versa.
The basic assumption underlying the above structure is that labor rather
_ __~___I _I I
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Table 3.3
TIME-OF-DAY RATES FOR INDUSTRIAL CUSTOMERS
WEPCO 1980
Time Demand System Enemry Charge enmand Charge
(cents/k Jh) Suner Jinter
$/K/month $/K.J/month
on-peak low WEPCO 3.3o 4.68KA/month 3.63KW/month
on-peak high JEPCO 3.77 4.68 3.60
on-peak low Hlodified 5.24 4.68 3.60
on-peak high Modified 5.G1 4.68 3.60
off-peak low WEPCO 1.65 - -
off-peak high WEPCO 1.84 -- . -
off-peak low Modified 3.09 - -
off-peak high Modified 3.34
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than capacity constraints are more important in determining demand
rescheduling. This assumption as vwell as the magnitudes used should be
carefully investigated in a second phase to the present study.
Only the cross-elasticities are specified by the response algorithm
parameter inputs. The own elasticities are then calculated to satisfy
the "constant consumption" and "constant expenditure" share assumptions
characterizing the demand response and consumer surplus estimation
algorithms, respectively. The ranges of price elasticities of demand
implied by the input parameters and the above assumptions are also
reported in the Tables 9.1 and B.2 in Appendix B as are the
characteristics of the generating systems used in the simulation (Tables
B.3 and 3.4).
In summary, the modeling structure developed for this effort combined
an existing utility simulation model with a price responsive demand
algorithm based on hourly spot prices. The structure allwoed for price
to refect the marginal system operating cost or system lambda under all
conditions in which the capacity minus spinning reserves exceed demand.
T4hen this condition was not met a quality of supply premium was added
which reflected the cost of increasing capacity. The analysis was
structured to evaluate only the responsiveness of the industrial
component of the load. The modeling structure itself, however, is not
limited to one component of the load but could be adapted to handle price
responsiveness of individual classes of customers. It should be pointed
out, however, that computer limitations of the simulation model used
would effectively restrict the handling of more than two customer
classes. In addition convergence of supply and demand at a spot price
would not necessarily be guaranteed within the modeling structure if
--- --- ~ "IYYIIIIIYI~~~ - IYIYI iir~
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different response algorithms were used for the customer classes.
The chapter which follows presents the limited case study i.aterial
for Wisconsin.
4-1
CHAPTER 4
WISCOl1SIN CASE STUDY RESULTS
The simulation model described in Chapter 3 'was used to analyse the
benefits of a one hour spot price rate for industrial customers in a
prototype isconsin utility. Two sets of scenarios were developed for
analysis. The first set were for the prototype utility given its current
generating stock assuming first the 1980 demand structure and then a
demand 10 percent greater than the 1980 demand but with no change in
generating capacity. In each case the effect of both a high and a low
response on the part of customers was evaluated. The second scenario
developed looked at the prototype Aisconsin utility but substituted oil
fired plants for specific of the coal fired units. (See Appendix B for
plant data.) This substitution was carried out to evaluate the potential
savings both in operating costs and in capacity that could be achieved if
the test utility were less well optimized to today's utility fuel costs.
The second or modified scenarios are more typical of the capacity and
fuel mix for the New England and California utilities where there is
considerably more dependence on oil. Table 4.1 summarizes the scenarios
evaluated in this analysis.
All simulations included two production cost iterations for initial
and modified demand. The simulations marked with a double x included a
second pass through the demand response and consumer surplus algorithms
yielding an improved estimate of the industrial customer electricity bill
and consumer surplus. The simulation algorithm was not carried out to
convergence because of the computational burden involved. Thus the
reported benefits are conservative estimates that bound the convergence
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Table 4.1
SPECIFICATION1 COMBINATIONS SI.IULATED
System Demand/ W.EPCO MODIFIED
Resoonse Low Demand High Demand Low Demand High Demand
Low Response x x
High Response xx xx x xx
estimates from below. Convergence problems were more severe with the
high demand scenarios where the industrial electricity bill was
particularly sensitive to a second pass through the demand response
algorithm. For each scenario simulated, Tables 4.3 to 4.4 present the
industrial customer electricity bill savings, and consumer surplus
realized under spot pricing compared to the present practice of
time-of-day (TOD) rates. The relative reliability of overall service by
the utility defined as the ratio of the loss of load probability under
TOD rates to the loss of load probability under spot pricing is
reported. The reduction in variable generating costs due to spot pricing
is also reported. Finally, Table 4.5 reports the net revenue of selected
generating units obtained as the difference between the social value of
electricity supplied and variable operating costs. The social value of
electricity is obtained by weighing generation by the spot price. This
net revenue is then capitalized after subtracting fixed 0+I costs by
assuming a 20-year service life and a 7 percent real (over and above
inflation) rate of return. The capitalized values indicate whether the
generating system is over or under invested in a particular generating
technology. As discussed in Chapter 2 the optimal generating nix under
spot pricing is such that net revenues as defined above are equal to
fixed 0+11 and capital servicing costs.
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Table 4.2 presents total variable generating costs, energy generdted,
loss of load hours (LOL'), and the industrial customer electricity bill
under TO3 prices and the various demand response and generating system
specifications.
The results presented in Tables 4.2 to 4.5 support the following key
points:
Short-term fuel savings the utility may realize due to
industrial customer spot pricing are of the order of 1 percent
of the industrial electricity bill if the assumption of constant
daily industrial electricity consumption is valid. Given that
this assumption is rather conservative, the 1 percent figure
should be interpreted as a lower bound with 5 percent an upper
bound if the non-industrial demand profiles remain unchanged.
Spot pricing implementation may result in substantial long-term
reductions in utility capital costs by reducing the need for
maintaining high reserve margins. Under the most conservative
assumption of demand response, industrial customer spot pricing
maintains the same reliability level for a 5 percent uniform
increase in total demand. This is equivalent to allowing a 5
percent decrease in reserve margin without deterioration in
service reliability.
Long-term efficiency gains will be made possible by spot
pricing. The current ,4EPCO generation mix would be
underinvested in base loaded nuclear plants and overinvestedin
peaking units if spot pricing were to be widely implemented. A
restructuring of the utility's generation mix coupled with a
reduction in the reserve margin maintained would be desirable
-- ~^1111 ~~ IIIYI YYIYIIIYYIIIYIIIYIIIY L i YI YIY  -rr
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Table 4.2
PERFOR'INICE UNJDER TOD PRICES
WEPCO
Low •Demand High Demand Low Demar
MODIFIED
Id .High Demand
Variable costs
sx 103
Energy gen.
LOLH
18176.3 GAH
18.0
19081.3 GJIH
40.9
18173.6 GAIH
35.25
19074.6 %aH
88.5
Industrial bill
g x 103
163,000 187,900 246,800 275,000
Table 4.3
PERFORMAPICE UNDER SPOT PRICES 14EPCO. SYSTE,4
Low Denand High Demand
Low Response Med. fesponse Low Response _ed. Response
Industrial bill 9,627 35,140 * *
savings, $x10
Percent of bill 5.8 pct. 21 pct. * 4 pct.
Consumer 95,600 *98,460 92,800 101,500
surplus, $x103
Percent of bill 58 60 49 54
Relative 1.87 2.18 1.06 1.22
Reliability
Fuel savings 928 1,128 1,993 2,375
$xT03
Percent of bill 0.6 0.7 1.1 1.3
*lot reported because second pass through demand response algorithm
was not obtained.
233,667 251,026 459,213 494,687
""" --
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Table 4.4
PERFOR:1.iJCE UINDER SPOT PRICES ;IODIFIEU SYSTE,
Demand Low
Response lediumn
Industrial bill
savings, Xx10 3
Percent of bill
Consumer surplus, 5x10 3
Percent of bill
Relative eliability
Fuel savings, 5x103
Percent of bill
-47,250
-19
72,740
29
2.05
1,800
0.8
Demand High
Response ;ledium
-71,140
-16
67,400
25
0.99
3,037
1.1
Table 4.5
PLAIT AVERAGE VARIABLE COST (AVC), NET REVENUE (NR) A.D CAPITAL
NET REVE!JULS (CiR)*
WEPCO 1MO4IFIED
Plant Low Demand High Demand Lotw Demand High Demand
PB2 AVC 5 mills/kilh 5 mills/klh 5 mill s/kih 5 mills/klh
JR 90.5 S/K.4 116 S/K'4 211 $/K~I 235 $r/K
CNR 982 $/K'1 1144 " 2142 " 2394 "
OC8 AVC 14.5 mills/kJh 14.5 mills/kh 32.5 mills/kIh 32.5 mills/kUh
NR 31 $/KA 48 $/KJ 30.5 $/K. 46.7 $/KW
CNR 251 " 435 " 247 " 417 "
PA1 AVC 19.8 mi l1s/kJ h 19.8 mills/k h 43.5 mills/k.1h 43.5 mills/klh
I4R 26.6 S/K,4 44.3 $/KA 14.6 $/KW 24.7 $/KW
CNR 122 " 307.6 " -- 102.0
OCCTAVC 50 mills/klh 50 mills/k.h 50 mills/klh 50 mills/k.Jh
NR 6 $/K'. 11 $/KlK 6.4 $/KW 11.3 $/K.
CIJR 42 " 94 " 46 " 98
CI!R is obtained
costs.
*!IR is the revenue over and above variable operating costs,
by capitalizing the difference between NR and fixed 0 and M
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under spot pricing and would result in substantial overall cost
of generation reductions. The need for reoptimizing the
generation mix is much more acute in the modified generating
system simulations. In such a system, the base-loaded
generators would realize excess profits under spot pricing. The
small net revenues of peaking units, although indicative of
overinvestment, should be interpreted with caution since the
simplified pricing algorithm used in this simulation does not
account for credits and charges related to meeting spinning
reserve requirements.
Comparison of the actual 1980 industrial electricity bill to the
value of industrial electricity consumption weighted by spot
price implies an insignificant overall subsidy between customers
and the utility. Of course, individual customer analysis may
indicate positive or negative cross-subsidies among customers,
but the overall cross subsidy averaged over all customers is
insignificantly different from zero. A 5 percent discrepancy
between the actual bill and the value of electricity is observed
which is well within the accuracy of the simplified pricing
algorithm used. Inclusion of the loss and transmission and
distribution components will more than likely account for a 5
percent discrepancy. The same conclusion, however, cannot be
sustained for the high demand scenario. In the high demand
scenario, the value of industrial demand obtained from the
actual 1980 profile (no rescheduling) is significantly larger
than the bill. This comes as no surprise, given that no
additional generation was added and demand charges were
4-7
unchanged despite the 5 percent increase in overall demand.
Finally, even accounting for customer response does not seem to
cause substantial redistritibutive concerns, especially if the
eventual decrease in reserve margin is considered.
Quite substantial customer benefits are possible through spot
price implementation. An upper bound of realizable customer
surplus consistent with a constant expenditure share hypothesis
is of the order of 50 percent of the 1S98 industrial customer
bill. This surplus is realizable because of the additional
flexibility and degrees of freedom imade available to industrial
consumers under spot pricing that allows them to choose their
electricity consumption patterns so as to minimize the overall
cost of electricity and other factor inputs. The utility
benefits in terms of variable cost savings, reserve margin
reductions, improvements in load factors, and the optimal
generation mix have not been simulated for the more optimistic
response assumption embedded in the estimation of an upper bound
in consumer surplus gains. It should be noted that utility
benefits will be higher than those presented above if the
optimistic response assumption holds.
The prospects for consumer rate rqduction with spot pricing
adjusted to meet utility revenue requirements are notable. In
the short run, rate reductions would be limited to a few
percentage points reflecting fuel savings. In the medium and
long runs, however, higher savings due to lower reserve margin
requirements and efficiency gains resulting from the
reoptimization of the generation mix will also be realized and
I~ ___ I ~~ -- IIMINIMl
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passed on to consumers. These savings will benefit all
consumers whether under TOD or spot pricing throu;h lower demand
generating costs and a lower rate base.
Finally, spot price implementation will benefit the capital
markets. It may keep some utilities out of the nation's capital
market by easing their investment requirements. Some utilities
on the other hand may need to radically alter their generation
mix and resort to substantial borrowing. The resulting
efficiency gains, however, will render such investments
productive, and hence make them easier to fund in the capital
market.
The need for accurate demand response parameter estimates is of
paramount importance. The benefits evaluated by the simulation
algorithm presented in this chapter are only indicative and
should be interpreted as orders of magnitude rather than as
reliable absolute value estimates. A good deal of empirical
investigation and actual experimentation will be necessary
before any actual widespread spot pricing implementation takes
place. From a preliminary evaluation point of view, however,
the present study has clearly provided evidence in support of a
high benefit of spot pricing hypothesis.
-- I~El lI YIUIu
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CHAPTER 5
BILL IIPACT ANALYSIS*
5.1 Introduction
Customer bill impact analyses were done at.both the aggregate class
and the individual customer levels to provide information for reconciling
current class revenue requirements with the class revenue that would be
generated with spot pricing rates. The two major concerns in reconciling
revenues were that the utility remain financially wnole and that no
individual customer should experience an increase in charges that would
he unfairly extreme. By construct it was expected that the proxy spot
pricini rates without a capacity surcharge would generate revenues below
current rate revenue levels. T'his would mean that all or part of the
class's bills would need to be increased to avoid interclass subsidy.
The aggregate analyses showed the revenue reconciliation problem to be
minimal at the class level. However, more work must be done with the
individual customer data to allow specific recommendations to be made
with regard to bill impacts for individuals.
5.2 Aggregate Bill Impact Analysis with Io Adjustments
Sunnary of Results
The initial bill impact analysis compared the actual 19S0 annual
class revenue level with the annual revenue level that would have been
earned if proxy system lambda rates were applied to actual 1980 customer
consumption levels. 'Jo adjustment was made for any price response and no
rationinj surcharge was included with the proxy system lambda rate. The
*Chapter 5 was largely the responsibility of 'Is. Leigh Riddick whose
efforts in data handling and analysis are gratefully acknowledged.
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actual 1989 class revenue level was based on the actual bills paid by the
custoriers in the class.
'4hen adjusted for marginal line losses the proxy revenues fell short
of actual revenues by only 6.6 percent. The actual numbers were:
Historical Revenue Estimate $156,629,108
Proxy Revenue Estimate $155,627,284
It is noteworthy that this shortfall in revenue of $11,001,824 could be
covered by a fixed monthly charge that would be less than the minimum
monthly charge in the General Primary tariff durin3 1980.* The annual
fixed charges necessary to reconcile revenues would be $20,488 per
customer and the minimum charges in the General Primary tariff was almost
$25,000 per customer.
Data
The consumption data were hourly KJI demand for 1980 for the 538
general primary time-of-use customers of WEPCO in lisconsin. These
customers were all billed on the basis of the 4EPCO tariff CP1 during
1980. To have qualified as a member of this class, a customer must have
contracted for three-phase, 60-Hertz power service at approximatey 3,810
volts or higher for periods of at least one year. These customers faced
an average minimum monthly bill of nearly $2000 at the beginning of
1980. The minimum charge was increased when revised tariffs were
implemented during 1980. The peak period was 8 am through 8 pm, Central
Standard Time, ilonday through Friday, excluding legal holidays. All
other hours were off-peak hours.
The data were provided by JEPCO on computer tape. Our initial
*Current and past tariffs are on file at the .lisconsin Public Service
Commission.
___mlurnim I - - -Ih
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reading of the data suggested two potential problens: (1) lissing
observations, and (2) Observations showing zero readings. These two
characteristics of the data set merited notice because without a complete
and accurate data set by hour, the hourly load modeling for use in
analyzing cost changes and bill impacts would not be complete or
accurate. Two steps were taken in the initial data analysis to deternine
the degree of severeity of these potential problems. First counts of
both the missing and zero readings, as well as their locations, were
obtained. Customers with unusual patterns of zero readings were flagged
as candidates for future individual graphical analyses and a review of
the error codes on the '1EPCO tapes. The graphical analyses and the error
codes revie%.ed supported the validity of the zero readings; most seenied
to 1e due to normal usage patterns (e.g., weekends contained zeroes) and
they were often associated with multiple meter* customers.
Second, the missing observations were replaced with the group's
average customer demand for that hour via the following algorithm:
Average Demand =
a
where: i indicate the hour, from 1 to 8764 (1980 = Leap Year)
a indicates the customer, from 1 to 538
D'is demand in hour i for customer a
I, is the "switch" in hour i for customer a which indicates
presence of an observation
*There were 40( multiple neter sites attributable to 32 customers.
"
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0: no observation present
1: observation present.
This procedure implies that missing observations are statistically random
across customer class at any hour. After the replacement was completed,
total annual kih class sales were only five percent greater than sales
recorded by the utility. An adjustment is made below to the company
revenue figures to account for this difference. This difference arose
from the fact that IEPCO does not use a standard algorithm to estimate
missing billing records. For this reason we could not duplicate its
replacement procedure exactly. The precise KwH figures were:
'4EPCO Sales* 4,779,949,091
General Primary Customer Tariff Records -5,033, 13,28
Difference (253,971, 117)
It should be noted that 243 (of 538) customers had complete records. Of
those with incomplete records, the number of missing hourly observations
varied from 24 hours (1 day) to 7560 hours (360 days).** However, no
single hour was missing more than 67 observations (12 percent) or less
than 28 observations (4 percent).
The sysem cost data used were hourly system marginal cost as
calculated during 1980 by the 'EPCO system control center. For each hour
marginal cost was calculated as follows:
1. Sum the actual unit generations on system for the hour.
2. Economically dispatch the sum from (1) among units with the unit
high limits being equal to the actual capabilities for the hour
and the unit low limits being the predefined minimum generations
for the unit.
*Source: Letter from P. Holte, IEPCO, dated July 27, 1981.
**If a portion of a day's readings were unavailable, the entire day
was scratched from JEPCO's records.
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3. Add purchased TI into total from (1).
4. Subtract one MAJ from the su;m in (3).
5. Economically dispatch the sum from (4) among units and purchases
with the hiqh limits of the units being the dispatched
generations from (2).
6. The difference in total cost between the dispatches in (2) and
(5) is the marginal cost.
There were twenty-three missing days of information* in the system cost
data. The missing hourly observations were filled in with a simple
interpolation of the observations on the applicable day before and the
day after the missing day (e.g., a missing Monday was filled in with an
interpolation bet!ween the previous Friday and the following Tuesday).
The historical revenue figure, which was based on WEPCO's monthly
sales analyses, was obtained from the company.* The amount of the actual
bills paid by General Primary customers, including fuel adjustment
charges, was used. The energy component of this amount was adjusted
upwards by the percentage difference in spot price KwH sales estimates
mentioned above, resulting in the following figures:
Original revenue $160,852,195
Energy revenue adjustment 5,776,913
TOTAL GENERAL PRIMARY REVEIUE $166,629,108
Spot price revenues were computed by the following algorithm:
Let
xij = load of jth customer at ith hour as defined above
MC. = system marginal cost at ith hour as defined above1
where
*jo observations were missing unless the entire day's observations
were missinq.
I _1 ____ _ _~~____
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i = 1 to 8764 (hours in 1920)
j = 1 to 538 (number of customers),
then
Spot Price Revenues = Rj
where
Rj = C XijrlCi
5.3 Individual Customer 3ill Impact Analyses
Summary of Results
Three simulated spot price bills were calculated for comparison with
the actual 1980 bills of a subset of the General Primary customers. The
three scenarios simulated were the proxy system lambda bills, the spot
price high demand bills, and the spot price low demand bills. The first
scenario is described above in the aggregate analysis. The remaining two
are described in more detail below in this chapter and in the preceding
discussion of Chapter 4.
The ten customers chosen for individual analyses were selected on the
basis of their usage patterns to provide information across a wide range
of customer types. Table 5.1 is a summary list of those customers and
their characteristics. The bills of these ten customers were simulated
using the proxy system lambda as described above and simulated spot
prices from the 1IEPCO low and high demand scenarios described in Chapter
3. Comparison of the simulated bills showed a fair amount of variation
of the average price per k.h consumed among customers. The two chosen
randomly had averages close to each other and to the total
NMI ini
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Table 5.1
STATISTICS OIJ IIJDIVIDUAL CUSTO.IERS CHOSEJ FOR BILL ANIALYSIS
Customer SIC
Choice Criteria* Code
Largest CD, k lh 3519
Largest INC 3531
Largest IICD L.F. 3221
iledium IICD L.F. 3469
Lowest !JOD L.F. 3G21
Largest CD L.F. 3312
vledium CD L.F. 2038
Lowvest CD L.F. 8211
Random 3321
Random 8211
k' h
Annual Sales 1980
116,356,939
21,606,186
23,887,268
44,446,681
13,003,532
28,654,708
4,114,434
825, 300
7,831,488
1,557,546
tJCD Peak
23,210
36,660
3,000
9,720
14,870
6,890
1,010
500
3, 190
510
K'W ICD CD
CD Peak
19,642
3,889
2,740
7,870
2,585
3,307
992
.477
1,639
187
L.F.
0.571
0.067
0.906
0.521
0.100
3.473
0.464
0.188
0.279
0.348
L.F.
0.674
0.632
0.992
0.643
0.573
0.986
0.472
0.197
0.544
0.948
*CD: Coincident demand.
NCD: Non-coincident demand.
LF: Load factor.
- - ---- ij , 131illai '"
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average. Some customers exhibited higher bills under spot pricing and
some lower in comparison to their actual 1930 yearly bills. This
indicates that the present TOD rate structure is subject to substantial
cross-subsidies aimong customers in the General Primary tariff class. Of
course, the customer demand profiles used were the observed ones and
hence unadjusted for customer response. Hence, the individual customer
bill reconciliation problem may be ameliorated under spot pricing. No
individual responses were simulated since they are customer-specific and
the actual characteristics of the selected customers were unkno;wn.
5.4 Interpretations and Recommendations
Individual bill analysis is unsuitable for drawing specific
recommendations on revenue reconciliation. The main problem is that the
algorithm used to replace missing observations for individual customer's
hourly readings resulted in some biases. The procedure is entirely
appropriate for the aggregate analysis, but it results in estimates that
are too high or low for individual customers who lie very far from the
mean consumption level for the group.
It is fairly straightforward to identify what needs to be done to
correct these problems in future work. The replacement procedure for
individual missing observations would need to be done on an individual
basis. Rather than substituting class averages, some average or
interpolation (similar to what was done for missing system data) would
need to be done for each customer.
In summary, the aggregate analyses suggest that class revenue under
spot pricing will not vary from historical revenue levels by a large
amount. This is encouraging because it greatly simplifies the revenue
5-9
reconciliation problem raised by current embedded revenue regulatory
procedures. However, more work is needed to specifically address
individual customer revenue reconciliation problems and the
cross-subsidies among customers in the same class.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Optimal or spot pricing was investigated in this report. Optimal
spot pricing was shown to be desirable because it improves the efficiency
of the electric power system. It can significantly improve the well
being of the utility system (generators and customers) through lower
costs, fewer blackouts and brownouts, easier integration of customer
owned generation and other advantages. It can give higher profits for
both the utility and its customers. Examples of the impacts of optimal
spot pricing include:
o Reducion of oil consumed in generation by raising prices explicitly
whenever oil is being used.
o Removal or reduction of the need for rotating blackouts to handle
emergency generation shortage situations, by using prices to give an
automatic socially efficient rationing system.
o Enhancement of and integration of wind, solar, and customer-owned
cogeneration into the grid by providing an energy marketplace which
values energy at its "true" value. Variable charges, backup charges,
and capacity credits are not needed.
Considerable transactions and communications costs may be associated with
spot pricing implementation. Although recent advances in microelectronic
and communications technology have rendered these costs small relative to
potential benefits for responsive or larger customers, it may be
preferable to use simpler or predetermined prices for some customers.
This report developed such optimal predetermined prices and showed their
relationship to optimal spot prices.
A case study was carried out with WEPCO data which simulated the
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impacts of spot pricing industrial electricity consumption under various
assumptions on demand response, available capacity reserve margin and
generation fuel costs. The case study results point toward the following
conclusions.
- The utility may realize short-term fuel savings of the order of I to
5 percent of the aggregate revenues received presently from
industrial consumers.
- Spot pricing of industrial consumers may result in a sizeable
reduction in reserve electricity margins by an amount equal to at
least 5 percent of present total yearly peak demand.
- Long-term efficiency gains will be possible through spot pricing via
reoptimization of the generating technology mix. Improvement of
overall load factors under spot pricing renders the present capacity
mix overinvested in peak and underinvested in base generation. The
spinning reserve value of peaking units should be accounted for
before reaching any firm conclusions on this matter.
- Comparison of actual aggregate revenues under the present Time of Day
rate structure to simulated revenues under spot pricing does not
indicate substantial subsidies and hence a need for major revenue
reconciliation action. However, individual customer analysis shows
substantial cross-subsidies among individual customers.
- Substantial consumer benefits in the form of sizeable consumer
surplus increases are possible through spot pricing. An upper bound
estimate of these gains obtained, indicated a possible gain of up to
50 percent of the current customer bill.
- Long-term benefits for consumers, over and above short-term
improvements are likely as a result of reduced capacity reserve
__ I______ IIIIIIIIYIYIIIIIII IIIYIIYIYIIYIIYII~
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margin requirements and long-term efficiency improvements through
generation mix reoptimization.
Beneficial impacts on the capital market are also possible under spot
pricing which will provide the opportunity for productive improvement
in efficiency and hence make capital financing easier.
A fair amount of uncertainty in the response parameters has resulted
in benefit estimates being reliable only as orders of magnitude. A
good deal of empirical investigation is needed to yield more reliable
response parameter estimates which can be then used to obtain better
and more accurate potential benefit values.
In summary, the present study has provided evidence in support of
high potential benefits of spot pricing.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that:
o Wisconsin proceed to the next step in the design of spot pricing
experiments and spot pricing rates for large industrial
customers. This analysis and other work under way indicates
that the potential for societal savings and for customer benefit
from participation in spot pricing rates are such that
experiments should begin.
o The State of Wisconsin adopt a framework of an instantaneous
spot price in which to analyze and evaluate alternative electric
services offered to all levels of customers. The concepts of
the instantaneous spot price should be expanded to commercial
and residential customers at least in so much as the rate
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design, cycle length, and the ability to rationalize between
utility rates can be brought into focus.
o The concept of an instantaneous spot price should be used to
rationalize all existing utility rates and load management
programs.
o The utilities should assume the lead in the design and marketing
of a range of internally consistent services to their customers
which will focus on the needs of their customers in terms of
cost savings, and as a result, using the basics of spot pricing
benefit to the utility. These benefits can be seen in terms of
overall cost savings, in terms of the energy requirements of the
individual customers and in terms of the reliability
requirements of the individual customers.
o A spot price experiment focussed on large consumers should be
designed within the State of Wisconsin. This should take four
major issues into consideration.
- Customers should be identified who are on time of use rates
(all current large industrial customer). Customers should
be identified who currently have energy management computers
or have the ability to respond with human schedulers to
changes in energy prices. Customers should be chosen who
have the ability either to store or reschedule energy use.
This would focus attention on industrial gas, ferrous and
non-ferrous scrap metals systems using electric arc furnaces
and metal scrapping activities. Finally, customers should
be identified on the basis of the price cycles that they
require in order to be able to respond to spot pricing.
~"-I-"- .. YIIIIIIIY 1~
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- Utility implementation. Utilities should work with their
own system operators to develop simple means of predicting
spot prices that would be in the medium to long-run
automatic within the utility. In addition they should work
to develop simple means for signaling prices to customers
and for evaluating response to those price signals. The
utilities should thoroughly evaluate the hardware
requirements for spot pricing experiments and for spot
pricing implementation based on the generic requirements for
analysis of individual customer loads, for communication
with the customer and for the customers response to spot
pricing signals.
- Regulatory actions. The regulatory structure should explore
the implications of using existing time of use rates for
spot pricing experiments through adaptation of, for
instance, the current fuel adjustment clause. It is
anticipated that existing rate structures will allow for
sufficient flexibility to move forward with experiments in
spot pricing prior to the time at which new, spot rates can
be set and agreed upon in the state. In addition, the
utility should encourage the development of alternative
rates for all customer classes which can take advantage of
the concepts of the instantaneous spot price.
- Research requirements. Additional research and development
is required in the area of customer response and monitoring
customer consumption patterns looking for critical loads and
looking for ways in which customers can respond to specific
6-6
lengths and levels of pricing for spot prices. In addition
the impact on the utility of different types of spot pricing
structures and cycles should be evaluated in greater detail
particularly as additional experimental data becomes
available.
-- -- - - - ----- --- - --"-' I-- -- ~1'11
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APPENDIX A
A Synopsis of Wisconsin Electric Power Company
Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WEPCO) is an investor-owned public
utility company operating in Wiconsin an the Upper Peninsula of
Michigan. A fully-owned subsidiary, Wisconsin Natural Gas Company,
distributes natural gas only within Wisconsin. WEPCO also owns and
operates a steam district heating system in downtown Milwaukee.
Approximately 75% of EPCO's revenues are derived from electricity sales,
24% from gas sales and 1% from steam sales.
In 1980, WEPCO sold 17,729 GWH and had a peak demand of 3,346 11W.
The utility is presently summer peaking, but winter and summer peaks are
forecast to be approximately equal by the mid-1980's, with the winter
peak dominating after that time.
WEPCO has been a leading innovator in the fields of time-of-day rates
and direct load control. All commercial and industrial customers with
consumption greater than 30,000 KWH per month are billed on a TOD
tariff. In addition, the larges 3,600 residential customers have been
placed on a mandatory TOD rate, which will be extended as an option to an
additional 10,000 customers.
An ambitious direct load control program for residential electric
water heaters was begun in 1978. This control system uses a powerline
carrier signal to remotely control the.customers' loads. By December
1930, 40,000 control units had been installed, with the projected goal of
10,000. For participating in this program, the customer receives a
monthly credit of $4.
WEPCO owns and operates a substantial number of generation facilities
throughout its service territory. The majority of these are coal fired;
-- -- ~ YIA Will.Y
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in 1980, these coal-fueled units generated 50% of the Company's needs.
WEPCO also owns and operates two 495 MW nuclear units at Point Beach on
Lake Michigan, which together generate about one-third of the company's
output.
The company also has the capability of importing substantial amounts
of energy through the strong interties it maintains with Commonwealth
Edison to the South and its neighboring Wisconsin utilities: Wiconsin
Power and Light (WPL), Wisconsin Public Service Corporation (WPS), and
Madison Gas and Electric. (The service territories of WEPCO, WPS and WPL
are contiguous and tend to be geographically interspersed.) During 1980,
WEPCO purchased nearly 13% of their KWH needs from other utilities.
In 1980, construction was completed on the 580 MW Pleasant Prairie
Unit I coal-fired cycling plant. The identical Unit 1 is scheduled to be
completed in 1984. WEPCO has purchased a 100 MW share of a 400 MW coal
unit from Wisconsin Power and Light that is also due to come on line in
1984. These capacity additions, combined with a 1.5-2.5% compound growth
rate of peak demand, mean that the company will need no additional
generation until the early 1990's.
WEPCO along with Madison Gas & Electric, Wisconsin Public Service
Corporation, Wisconsin Power & Light and the Upper Peninsula Power
Company form the basis of the Wisconsin Upper Michigan Systems (WUHS).
WUflS is a regional planning group with the responsibility of coordinating
the planning, operation, and maintenance of generation and transmission
facilities for the member utilities. WUMS also represents these
utilities in the planning and operation activities of the regional
planning group MAIN. WEPCO does not belong to the form power pool
consisting of the three other Wisconsin utility members of WUMS.
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Residential and small commercial sales and industrial sales are
approximately 30% and 25% respectively of total electric sales. The
composition of these customer groups is similar to those of other Midwest
utilities.
Industrial sales account for about 35% of WEPCO's total sales. The
largest portion of these industrial sales are made in a few manufacturing
categories. These are fabricated metal products and machinery, primary
metal (foundries), paper, food, machinery, electrical machinery and
equipment, and transportation equipment. These customers are grouped
mainly in the Milwaukee metropolitan area, Racine, and Kenosha.
The interruptible service tariff offered by the utility to its
industrial customers consists of a 60% reduction in the demand charge for
firm service. As of January 1982, 4 large customers have placed 51 MW of
connected load on this interruptible tariff.
Unless otherwise noted, the tables on the following pages are from
Wisconsin Electric's Statistical Report for the 10 years ending December
31, 1980.
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SERVICE TERRITORY
Wisconsin Electric Power Co. is engaged principally in the
generation. transmission. distribution and sale of electric
energy in a territory consisting of approximately 12.600
square miles in southeastern Wisconsin. tncluding the
rvetr(ox)itan Milwdukee die d. the east central and northern
portions of Wisconsin and the Upper Peninsula of Michigan.
The operating area has an estimated population of over
2.000.000.
The company owns all the common stock of Wisconsin
Natural Gas Co.. which purchases natural gas from Michigan
Wisconsin Pipe Line Co.. then jistnbutLs and sells it in
two service areas: west and south of Milwaukee. and in the
Appleton area. The gas service territory which has an
est irnated population of over 800.000 is mainly within the
elc tric service area of the company.
the executive offices of the company are located at
231 W. Michigan St.. P.O. Box 2046. Milwaukee. W1 53201.
telephone (414) 277-2345.
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Capabilities of Electric Generating Plants-Year 1980
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WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY SYSTEM
Electric Revenue and Expense Statistics
Year Ended Lecmber 3i 1980
OPERATING INCOME 'SO00)
OPERATING REVENUES ............. $761.232
OPERATING EXPENSES
Fuel......... ................ 213.467
Purctased power .............. 63.203
Other oeration expenses
Production. .......... 43.414
Tr-ansmrnssin an:J Jstruruton 29.364
Customer accounts . .... 15.095
Sates ani us:to.er service . ......... 3.127
Administrative a'd general ....... . 47.163
Maintenance ......... .. ... 72.870
Taxes other than income taxes ..... 31.399
Depreciation
Straight line ................... 60.992
Deferred income taxes ....... 20.945
Federal -ncome ta\..... .... (281)
Investment tax cre ' t ajustments
-Net ................... 30.660
State income tax ........ ....... 2.096
Totil Or-ratino Exoenses,.. 633.514
OPERATING INCOME ................. $17.718
STATISTICS
Average Number of Customers ........ 802.090
Electric Energy Output (Million KW'H)
Net generaticn
Fossil . . .... .... 9.983
Nuclear ............. . . 6.066
Hydraulic ............ .... 456
16.505
Pur ,, I .vl nowI . . 2.403
18.908
Company use. transmissicn losses
and unacLounted for ............ 1.179)
Energy sold ........................ 17.729
Fuel Cost per Net Generated KWH
Fossil fuel ........ .......... 1.8C
Nuclear fuel .......... ...... .. .48C
Total Production Cost ~
Net Generated KWH
Fossil ................. ...... 2.49C
Nu leii ... ...... .77C
Hydraul .... ..... ......... .43C
Maintenance Expense as Percent of
Average Deprecabe Plant. ......... 4.04%
Deprecation Expense (Straight Line)
as Percent of Avera4e
Depreciable Plant .................. 3.SS
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APPEN~DIX B
The "JEPCO" system without 1980 economy sales or purchases and a 410 11,
inter-tie backup is used along with a "Modified" system which was
obtained from the IEPCO system by modifying the fuel cost of coal-fired
units to resemble oil-fired units and reducing intertie backup to 200
.I. Tables 3.3 and 0.4 give for each plant the forced outage rate (FOR),
the maintenance requirements in weeks (MIfJT.JKS), the variable and fixed
operating and maintenance costs (0+M), the fuel cost (FUEL), the number
of blocks (BLKS) making tup each plant, and the total capacity (CAP).
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IEDIUM
Hour of day j
Hour of day 1
Table 0.1
RESPONSE CROSS-ELASTICITIES OF SU3STITUI0iJ (.ij)
Ilight Shift Day Shift Evening Shift
1, 2, ... , 7.8 9, ... , 20 21, 22, ... , 24
8.3 3.3 5.o
9
* 6.6 8.3 6.6
20
21
. 5.0 3.3 8.3
24
JNote: a) Diagonal elements for i = j are not defined.
b) Price elasticities of demand cij are defined as the percent
change in demand i over the percent change in price j. They equal the
product of oij and expenditure share j for i j j. They take values
ranging as follows:
.ij = .0008 to .007 for i j j
E = -.03 to -.08 in the demand response algorithm.11
S= -. 95 to -1.1 in the consumer surplus algorithm.11
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Table B.2
LOW RESPONSE CROSS-ELASTICITIES OF SUBSTITUION (i..)13
Hour of day j
Hour of day i
NJight Shift
1, 2, ... , 7.8
2.7
Day Shift
9, ... , 20
1.1
Evening Shift
21, 22, ... , 24
1.6
8
9
. 2.2 2.7 2.2
20
21
. 1.6 1.1 2.7
24
Note: a) Diagonal elements for i = j are not defined.
b) Price elasticities of demand sij are defined as the percent
change in demand i over the percent change in price j. They are equal to
the product of a and expenditure share j for i / j. They take values
ranging as follows:
Eij = .0002 to .002 for i f j
e.. = -. 01 to -.03 in the demand response algorithm.
C.. = -. 98 to -1.05 in the consumer surplus algorithm.11
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Table B.3
PLANT D,,TA: WEPCO SYSTE-I
PLANT
1 PB2
2 PB1
3 OC8
4 OC7
5 0C6
6 OCS
7 0C4
8 0C3
9 OC2
0 OCI
1 PW5
2 PV4
3 PV3
4 PW2
5 FWV
6 VAL2
.7 VALI
8 LSCT
.9 COMN
10 OCCT
1 PWCT
2 PBCT
13 GMTI
.4 GMT2
15 GMT3
16 CMT4
17 HYWE
18 PP1
19 HYPP
30 EGCI
31 EMG 2
32 EMG3
33 VOLC
34 EMER
FUEL I BLKS CAP
44.0 3 498
FOR
.058
.058
.114
.114
.157
.157
.110
.110
.110
.110
.056
.056
.056
.056
.056
.029
.029
0.000
.023
.300
.300
.300
.146
.146
.146
.146
.012
123
.012
100
.100
.100
0.000
0.000
MNT WKS
6
6
7
7
8
8
8
8
8
8
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
0
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
6
2
0
0
0
0
0
0&H
VAR FIX
.44 7
.44 7
1.98 7
1.98 7
2.40 9
2.40 9
3.32 4
3.32 4
3.32 4
3.32 4
3.17 15
3.17 15
3.17 15
3.17 15
3.17 15
2.66 12
2.66 12
2.30 14
2.13 38
3.44 2
3.44 2
3.44 2
2.09 10
2.09 10
2.09 10
2.09 10
1.00 1
1.43 7
1.00 1C
83.00 C
83.00 €
83.00 {
83.00 1
83.00 (
498
272
281
246
246
114
114
101
lot
77
80
80
80
80
134
134
30
31
20
30
20
53
53
53
53
59
480
19
100
100
100
0
44.0 3
141.0 3
141.0 3
141.0 3
141.0 3
141.0 3
141.0 3
141.0 3
141.0 3
153.0 2
153.0 2
153.0 2
153.0 2
153.0 2
159.0 3
159.0 3
281.0 2
305.0 2
291. 0. 2
450.0 2
450.0 2
534.0 2
534.0 2
534.0 2
534.0 2
0.0 3
185.0 3
0.0 1
0.0 3
0.0 3
0.0 3
0.0 1
0.0 1
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Table B.4
PLANT DATA: iODIFIED SYSTEM
O&M
PLANT FOR MNT WKS VAR FIX FUEL I BLKS CAP
1 PB2 .058 6 .44 7 44.0 3 498
2 PB1 .058 6 .44 7 44.0 3 498
3 OC8 .114 7 1.98 7 341.2 3 272
4 OC7 .114 7 1.98 7 341.2 3 281
5 0C6 .157 8 2.40 9 341.2 3 246
6 OC5 .157 8 2.40 9 341.2 3 246
7 OC4 .110 8 3.32 4 341.2 3 114
8 OC3 .110 8 3.32 4 341.2 3 114
9 OC2 .110 8 3.32 4 341.2 3 101
10 OCI .110 8 3.32 4 341.2 3 101
11 PV5 .056 3 3.17 15 370.3 2 77
12 PW4 .056 3 3.17 15 370.3 2 80
13 PW3 .056 3 3.17 15 370.3 2 80
14 PW2 .056 3 3.17 15 370.3 2 80
15 PWI .056 3 3.17 15 370.3 2 80
16 VAL2 .029 3 2.66 12 384.8 3 134
17 VAL1 .029 3 2.66 12 384.8 3 134
18 LSCT 0.000 0 2.30 14 281.0 2 30
19 COMM .023 3 2.13 38 305.0 2 31
20 OCCT .300 1 3.44 2 291.0 2 20
21 PWCT :300 1 3.44 2 450.0 2 30
22 PBCT .300 1 3.44 2 450.0 2 20
23 CMTI .146 1 2.09 10 534.0 2 53
24 GMT2 .146 1 2.09 10 534.0 2 53
25 GMT3 .146 1 2.09 10 534.0 2 53
26 GMT4 .146 1 2.09 10 534.0 2 53
27 HYWE .012 2 1.00 10 0.0 3 59
28 PPI .123 6 1.43 7 447.7 3 480
29 HYPP .012 2 1.00 10 0.0 1 19
30 EMGC .100 0 83.00 0 0.0 3 100
31 EMG2 .100 0 83.00 0 0.0 3 100
32 EMC3 .100 0 83.00 0 0.0 3 100
33 VOLC 0.000 0 83.00 0 0.0 1 0
34 EMER 0.000 0 83.00 0 0.0 1 0
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2UTILITY SPOT PRICING STUDY: WISCONSIN
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The objective of the Utility Spot Pricing Study has been to evalwute,
for a prototype Wisconsin electric utility, the potential benefits to
both the customers and to the utility of utilizing a specific type of
spot pricing for large industrial customers and to make recommendations
for further experimentation and potential rate-making based upon spot
pricing. In order to accomplish this objective a set of studies of both
the utility and selected industrial customers was carried out and an
existing simulation model expanded to allow for incorporation of customer
response to changing electrical energy prices. The conclusions and
recommendations presented in this summary build both upon the direct
results of this effort and upon the results of parallel theoretical and
application efforts carried out by the MIT Energy Laboratory.
Spot pricing of electric energy refers to the pricing of electricity
to reflect the time varying costs of generation as seen by the utility.
Today all utility rates are based either retrospectively or prospectively
upon the the average time-varying operating and capital costs. These
rates are generally the average utility costs measured over the cycle in
which prices are updated--generally the period between rate cases or fuel
adjustment updates.
Spot pricing utilizes as-the starting point for all rate calculation
the instantaneous marginal or operating cost of generation including
transmission and distribution losses. At times of capacity shortage a
charge reflecting the value of marginal electricity to customers is added
(quality of supply) to create the instantaneous spot price.
........ IIIiliI inianlliilln ll
3The cost of generation may vary considerably from minute to minute,
day to day and season to season. Spot pricing communicates the changing
utility costs to the customer as changing electricity prices. The issue
becomes one of choosing the appropriate frequency of price updates or the
pricing cycle length by trading off cost-saving benefits against the
costs of transactions between the utility and the customer. Price
updates may be as frequent as every five minutes for highly automated
industrial firms or as infrequent as once a year as is currently the case
for most residential customers. The summary paragraphs which follow show
the relationship between spot prices and the rates which are currently
offered ky utilities. As will be seen, all rates can be directly related
to spot prices, they vary only in the time cycle between changes in price
and in the number of price levels offered to the customer.
THE INSTANTANEOUS SPOT PRICE MARKETPLACE: Operates in the instantaneous
time frame of the system dispatcher. In today's'utility system the
currency of the spot marketplace the cost of the most expensive unit or
purchase* plus marginal T&D losses and a quality of supply premium.
Given an instantaneous spot price:
o All rates can be related directly to the instantaneous spot
price and to each other.
o All customers with the same update cycle i.e. time between
changes in prices, see the same price within a given level of
service or voltage class.
*This concept is called short-run marginal costing by economists and
is related to the system lambda of economic dispatch.
o A menu of dffferentrat-es can be designed by varying cycl e
length and the detail of pricing period definitions.
o The longer the cycle length and the less detailed .the prlring
period definition, the higher the cost of providing an equally
reliable service.
The following represent a limited set of spot rates which span the range
of both cycle length and today's utility rates. As was stated above,
other rates may be described in a parallel manner.
5 MINUTE SPOT PRICE: The shortest time varying rate discussed. The
pricing cycle is five minutes reflecting the expected cost of
generation. The information utilized is analogous to the time frame used
by the system dispatcher and incorporates system lambda or its equivalent
as the marginal operating cost.
1 HOUR SPOT PRICE: Equivalent to the 5 minute spot price with
recalculation on a I hour cycle. This study examined the benefits of a
I hour spot price structure.
24 HOUR UPDATE SPOT PRICE: Hourly prices are set for the next 24 hours
one day ahead based on the expected value of spot marketplace costs for
each hour. This calculation is based on the same projections used in the
predispatch done by today's system operators.
TIME OF USE AND FLAT RATES: These current utility rates could be spot
price based if the rate is defined as the average expected value of the
------- I~ IIIIIIYIIYIIYYIIIIUIi
5instantaneous spot price within the update cycle given prespecified time
blocks that represent the pricing period definition.
INTERRUPTIBLE RATES AND DIRECT LOAD CONTROL: Current utility
interruptible rates and direct load control such as water heater and air
conditioner control can also be described through the structure of the
spot marketplace by recognizing that these are services provided by the
utility to its customers to control customer costs by guaranteeing that
customer energy costs per KwH do not exceed the customers prespecified
level of acceptance, i.e. that the customer never is charged more than an
agreed upon cost for energy. The actual rate charged for this service
would be based upon the expected value of energy generated below the
prespecified interrupt cost level.
BENEFITS OF SPOT PRICING
Electric energy increasingly represents a significant cost for all
consumers whether large industrial customers trying to maintain a
relative market advantage, commercial customers supplying heating and
cooling services to their tenants or their own facilities, or residential
customers maintaining comfort and services within their own homes. This
desire for cost control is also reflected in the utility's operations.
Eroding stock values, difficulties in raising new capital and general
tension between the utility, its customers and the regulatory bodies all
find a common origin in higher costs of electric energy.
Spot pricing addresses the issues of cost control both for the
customer and for the utility by developing sets of consistent price
structures which allow customers to adjust their consumption patters
to the actual time-varying cost&. This is accomplished through the
development of a set of consistent tility services to customers--a menu
of service options with customer cost savings as their primary
objective. The significance of basing this menu of options upon spot
pricing is that customer savings result generally from demand response to
spot pricing. A beneficial impact on overall utility costs is also
realized. In the aggregate all customers, whether under spot pricing or
not, benefit.
From the perspective of the customer, spot pricing can provide the
basis for scheduling industrial processes to take advantage of lower
energy costs during specific periods of a given day or during specific
seasons of the year. Most of the spot price based rates proposed in this
report provide sufficient information to the customer to allow the
customer to choose to consume electricity on a when available at the
"right price" basis. On a day-by-day basis, the knowledge that the price
will be higher during certain midday hours will have the effect of
encouraging high electric use operations to be rescheduled around that
period so long as cost-effective excess capacity and/or product storage
is available. At times when a facility is operating at full capacity and
full production is valuable, a manager may continue to consume even at
high spot price levels.
Smaller or non-energy-intensive customers are less likely to afford
expensive communication and control equipment. In the near term most
small customers will choose manual control of their energy use. However,
concerned customers may wish to monitor hourly spot prices and program
their consumption through home computers. The more likely pattern is for
the customer to take advantage of the utility's assistance in controlling
~I - ---------------
7air conditioners or water heaters when the instantaneous spot price
exceeds a prespecified level.
From the perspective of the utility, spot pricing brings a set of
equally significant benefits. The most basic in the present environment
is that the utility and customer make production and consumption
decisions based on common cost information. The utility is providing or
selling a service. It is not the consumer's adversary but rather a
partner in an effort to reduce the customer's (and its own) costs. The
utility can now provide essentially all of the electricity that any
customer might wish--at a price.
Spot pricing simplifies the role of the regulatory commission. The
intense adjudicatory proceedings surrounding the setting of individual
rates are replaced by simpler and internally consistent processes of
agreeing to the formulae by which spot prices for different time cycles
and price period definitions are set. Once the formulae are agreed upon,
the task of the commission is in monitoring and in revenue reconciliation.
Spot pricing improves customer-utility mutual understanding through
increased customer options. It will always be difficult to quantify the
value of improved understanding by the customer of the utility's problems
and by the utility of the customers' desires. However, it is very real.
Offering the customers an internally consistent, easy to understand menu
of options based on spot prices is a major step in this direction.
Much of the cost control and increase in benefits resulting from
implementation of a spot price based marketplace comes from the fact that
it enables both the customers and the utility to better deal with the
many uncertainties that exist. (Such as the future availability and cost
of energy as determined by weather uncertainties, plant outages, possible
oil embargoes or nuclear moratoriums, and the eventual potential
development of new fuel sources and energy technologies.) A spot price
based marketplace does not eliminate the risks associated with
uncertainties. However, the uncertainties can be dealt with and the
roles shared in a more effective fashion because of the natural feedback
that results between the utility and the customers.
To summarize, no single action or approach can answer all of the
problems of the utility industry. However, spot pricing moves the
industry forward by bringing the customer in as a responder to the time
varying costs of generation. Spot pricing exploits the revolution in
microprocessing and in communications to establish a true marketplace
where transaction cost and value are reflected in the buy/sell decision
rather than the regulatory proceedings or special legislation.
PROJECT OBJECTIVES
The primary objective of the Utility Spot Pricing Study for Wisconsin
was to evaluate the benefits of spot pricing to industrial customers and
a prototype utility in Wisconsin. In order to accomplish this, the
project had the following set of sub-objectives.
o To review the background in theory and literature that has been
developed for spot pricing.
o To develop and implement a method of benefit estimation for a
prototype Wisconsin utility.
o To carry out a survey of large customers to evaluate their
potential response to spot pricing.
o To develo and i.plement a methodology for incorporating
customer price response into a utility simulation model.
I_ _ _C
9o To evaluate the utility/customer/societal benefits from spot
pricing systems.
o To evaluate the potential impact on the individual customers
bills.
o To make a set of recommendations for proceding to develop sp
pricing experiments in Wisconsin.
o To broaden the analysis by evaluating alternative utility
capital stocks based more on oil than on coal and nuclear as
the case in Wisconsin.
o To review the availability of hardware for spot pricing
experiments.
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These objectives were then aligned to create a research plan that
allowed for a smooth flow of information from the sub-objectives to the
final analysis of the benefits of spot pricing for Wisconsin.
CONCLUSIONS
The Wisconsin study netted a set of significant conclusions that are
here grouped into two categories. The first category is that of general
conclusions which are applicable, we believe, to any utility system
regardless of its generating stock or its customer characteristics. It
should be pointed out, however, that the benefits are greatest under
circumstances in which the utility generating stock is in short supply
and in which the utility must operate with oil or other expensive
generating fuels on the margin. In addition, the benefits are the
greatest under circumstances in which customers have the ability to
either defer load or to store either energy or final product. The
responsiveness of customers is a major determinant of the total benefit
to customers, to utility and to society as a whole generated by a spot
pricing system.
The general conclusions which were drawn from this study and from
other experience of the research team are the following:
o Under spot pricing the joint benefits to the utility and to the
customer can be clearly seen in the increase in what the
economist refers to as consumer surplus.
o There is a reduction in oil consumption by the utility when
prices reflect marginal fuel costs. By the same token there is
an increase in consumption of lower cost fuels such as coal.
o With spot pricing there is an increase in system reliability.
This increase in system reliability is brought about by the
responsiveness of customers to increases in utility generating
costs. As will be seen in the specific conclusions, this
increase in reliability may be significant.
o There is a general enhancement in the ability of distributed
energy technologies such as cogenerators and/or small generators
to integrate into the utility system when spot pricing is the
method of payment for electricity generated. The value of
electricity to the utility from a cogenerator is most easiliy
measured using the system spot price as defined in the
introduction.
The general conclusions are valid for most, if not all, electric
generation systems. Spot pricing acts to save customers additional funds
through encouragement of greater efficiency in timing and amount of
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electric energy used. in addition it increases the reliability of the
system through the responsiveness of customers thereby sharing or
cooperating with the utility in the provision of that reliability.
Finally, the ability to integrate new energy technologies into the grid
under the terms of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PL 95-617)
is greatly enhanced.
From the Wisconsin study there are a set of specific conclusions that
can be drawn. It should be emphasized that the conclusions are based
upon a simulation analysis of a prototype Wisconsin utility. The
prototype utility had both coal and oil on the margin during the test
year., The utility has considerable rese-ve capacity on line.
Reliability analyses were carried out by increasing demand while holding
capital stock fixed. For analytic ease it was assumed that there were no
interconnections. Given these caveats the conclusions which were drawn
are the following:
o Given the implementation of spot pricing for industrial
customers the utility will be able to save between I and 5
percent of its total fuel costs. This reflects a basic shift
away from high cost fuels such as oil toward the lower cost
fuels of coal and nuclear.
o Given the prototype system evaluated there is a potential of a
reduction in reserve capacity of roughly 5 percent brought about
by the increase in customer response to spot price.
o In the long term there is a possibility of a gain in the total
efficiency of the utility system through a reoptimization of the
utility cpital stock. This is once again brought about by the
responsiveness of customers toward variable marginal costs
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thereby allowing the utiltty to reoptimize its capttal sto~k
toward increased base load plants and away from oil fired
intermediate and peaking plants.
o -Given the spot price structure chosen and the modeling
techniques chosen, there appear to be only minimal issues
associated with revenue reconciliation on the part of the
utility and the regulatory commission. It must be emphasized
that revenue reconciliation will always be an issue in a
regulated utility structure under spot pricing as it is an issue
under the current regulatory structure. The importance of the
findings in this study is that the order of magnitude of the
revenue reconciliation problem is not any greater than that
faced by most regulators and utilities in today's marketplace.
o The final conclusion may be the most important from this study
and that is that the total customer benefits possible from the
adoption of a spot pricing structure could be as high as 50
percent. Once again these customer benefits depend on the
ability of customers to readjust their loads to reflect changing
electric prices. Such benefits are, under any circumstances,
highly significant and require serious further consideration on
the part of both the utility and the utility commission for
implemention of spot pricing.
In summary, the major conclusions of the research project were that
spot price based utility rates appear to hold considerable promise for
overall savings. The potential customer benefits to participating in a
spot pricing system are as high as 50 percent. In almost all instances
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the utility and customers as a group can benefit by increased cooperation
and information flow between the utility and its customers using the
currency of spot price. This results in far greater short term
efficiencies represented by the utility savings of between 1 and 5
percent in fuel cost and the potential for long term gains in efficiency
through reoptimization of the capital stock.
RESEARCH STRUCTURE
The research and modeling effort was divided into three major blocks;
customer response analysis, utility impact analysis, and customer bill
analysis.
Customer response analysis was carried out in parallel with the
initial utility modeling activity and the utility impact analysis. A set
of industrial facilities in the Wisconsin area were visited and plant
operators and plant managers interviewed. This was a non-random, small
sample of those customers that, a priori, appeared to have a potential
for responding to variable prices. After detailed discussions with
roughly ten industrial firms, the responses to the questions asked
concerning energy use, energy storage and product storage were
categorized into sets of actions which any individual facility might
take. These sets of actions fell into two broad areas. The first area
was that of rescheduling of load. Rescheduling was seen as first, a
movement of process flows within a given labor shift. The second was
seen as the possibility of moving specific high-energy processes from one
shift to another where this did not interrupt the flow of plant
processing. The second category was that of storage. Considerable
effort was spent on evaluating the availability of both product storage,
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i.e., intermediate goods to be used in the final assembled product, and
the storage of energy through, for instance, on-site generation and/or
on-site thermal storage.
Having completed the plant visits and the categorization of plant
responses, a set of small scale optimization models were carried out in
parallel with the Wisconsin study. These models attempted to evaluate
the most cost effective alternatives for individual customers.
Based upon the plant visits, the response categorization, and the
limited optimization modeling, a response algorithm was developed for
incorporation into the utility simulation model. This response algorithm
was based on the assumption that within a given facility, total energy
use would not change over a 24 hour period, i.e. given aggregate
industrial demand as it exists under time of use rates, the total demand
for a 24 hour period would remain constant under a spot pricing system.
A translog mathematical function was developed which allowed the research
team to compare the cost of energy consumed on a hour-by-hour basis
between the existing time-of-use rate and the calculated spot price. The
difference between the time-of-use rate and the spot price was then used
to create the ratio of distribution of energy usages between hours in a
given 8 hour shift. Load was rescheduled based on the following set of
heuristic rules.
o Rescheduling was most easy within a given shift
o Rescheduling was second most easy when it shifted load and
manpower from night to day.
o Rescheduling was most difficult when it required rescheduling of
manpower and energy use from a day shift to the night shift.
_ _1_7~~1
15
The customer response analysis was then incorporated into the utility
impact analysis through development of two parallel scenarios which
represented a low and a high level of response on the part of the
aggregate industrial consumer group in the prototype utility.
The results of the customer response analysis were significant in our
evaluation of the overall benefits to spot pricing. Our analysis
indicated that rescheduling of electric energy use was possible in nearly
every facility. This, despite the fact that many plant managers argued
initially their schedules were too tight to be able to take advantage of
short price changes. This appeared not to be the case when one evaluated
the current practices in "beating the demand charge" which employed, from
the utility's perspective, suboptimal rescheduling activities. The
critical questions associated with rescheduling for an individual
facility are those of the cost-benefit between the current rate
structure, a flat rate structure, and the spot pricing structure and the
issue of what pricing cycle is the most appropriate, both in terms of
transaction cost and in terms of the ability of the individual customer
to respond. These pricing cycles ranged from minutes to months.
The further conclusion of the customer response analysis was to
identify specific types of facilities which showed a significant ability
to response to spot pricing. In general these facilities were ones that
have product storage (this represents a cost-free storage of electrical
energy). An example of such storage is in industrial gas production
where no energy is lost if the compression facilities are shut down for
some specific amount of time to respond to a change in energy price. A
similar case exists in the compacting of scrap metal into bales, where
once again, the schedule may be shifted so long as some excess capacity
im~mains. The second best type of facility to respond to spot pricing
were facilities with processes that had both high demand and high thermal
mass. An example is el~ctric arc furnaces. A number of isfts were made
to facilities utilizing electric arc furnaces in both ferrous and
non-ferrous processing. In all instances it was shown that the
facilities were taking advantage of cost savings through demand limiting
activities which saved money for the customer but did very little to
assist the utility in its cost of production. A second example of those
facilities which have high thermal mass and thereby the possibility of
using thermal mass for storage are large buildings which have air heating
and cooling equipment. The building itself can act as the storage unit
for electrical energy in the form of cool or hot air for some amount of
time. In both the case of the electric arc furnaces and the building
systems, the cycle length will determine the ability of the system to
respond. In general then it was seen that the customers had the ability
at the industrial and large commercial scale to respond to spot prices,
particularly the 24 hour look ahead spot price which offered the customer
the greatest ability to plan ahead in a reasonable cycle for the
production of the facility.
Utility impact analyses were carried out using an existing utility
simulation model, ENPRO, developed by ENTEC of Rockland, Maine. The
ENPRO model is a Monte Carlo simulation of hourly demand for a utility
system. The model was modified in order to allow the research group
first to calculate the hourly cost of generation, i.e. the spot price
based upon the unmodified demand. Given the spot price, the demand was
modified according to the demand modification algorithm and the cost of
generation was recalculated. The system was then iterated once to see
-- 1111111111111
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the sensitivity of the hourly structures to increased fine tuning of the
customer response/generation loop. The ENPRO model was felt to be a
successful simulation tool for this purpose. The Monte Carlo structure
allowed for a range of forced outage conditions to be evaluated for each
hourly period.
From this analysis it was shown that there were short term fuel
savings in the range of I and 5 percent. In the longer term, the results
show that up to a 5 percent decrease in reserve margin requirements would
be brought about by the customer response to spot pricing without any
change in system reliability. The major conclusion was that the spot
pricing structure and the custonmer response to it offered to the utility
the potential for "stretching" of the utility capital stock. This meant
that the utility could utilize its existing capital stock more
efficiently and, in the future, would add additional stock that would
reflect this change in consumption and customer response patterns.
Customer bill impact analysis was carried out both at the aggregate,
i.e. total industrial class level and at the disaggregated or individual
company level. At the aggregate level revenues were estimated given both
a current time of use rate structure and the proxy system lambda or spot
price for electricity for the class as a whole. Given the results of the
two analyses, with spot price and with time of use rates, it was possible
to see that the utility would have under-recovered revenues using the
spot price system but that under recovery was only of the order of 6 to 7
percent. In general it can be stated that the level of revenue recovery
is a function of the utility's level of excess capacity and the relative
level of optimization of the utility generating stock. In a system with
high excess capacity, the utility will under recover revenues. In a
s-ystem where capacity is short, the utility will over-recover. By the
same token, in a utility that is poorly optimized given today's fuel cost
structure, the utility will over-recover. A utility that is
well-optimized in today's structure will either break even or slightly
under-recover.
The issue of revenue reconciliation is not dealt with extensively in
the report nor was it in the project as a whole. There is a significant
literature available on revenue reconciliation which focusses on an
attempt to reconcile through the rate structure in such a way as not to
affect the basic economic signals or prices being sent to the individual
customers. This can be done either through an adjustment on a pro-rata
or on a fixed cost basis. Either of these will satisfy the basic
conditions of revenue reconciliation quite simply in an instance in which
the revenue gap is small. Because this study handled only one prototype
utility, and that prototype utility showed a small revenue gap, the issue
does not arise as significantly as it could were a large revenue gap were
to appear for a specific utility under investigation.
The disaggregated customer bill impact analysis encountered a number
of difficulties. In the initial analysis of specific customers much of
the data by hour was missing. As a result the data was filled in through
an averaging procedure which did not affect the aggregate analysis but
did affect the disaggregated analysis. In addition it has long been know
that there are inter-class subsidies between individual customers. This
showed in the analysis of the individual customer bills.
The individual bill analysis looked at a limited sample of large
customers with varying types of consumption characteristics, ranging from
relatively flat load to extremely peaked loads. It was shown that some
I
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of these customers, with no response to spot pricing, saved funds by
maintaining their behavior and simply receiving the new price structure.
Other customers, particularly those with highly peaked loads, were shown
to be at a distinct disadvantage under the new price structure. It must
be emphasized, however, that the individual analyses were non-random
samples and were taken from incomplete data assuming no response on the
part of the individual customers.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that:
o Wisconsin proceed to the next step in the design of spot pricing
experiments and spot pricing rates for large industrial
customers. This analysis and other work under way indicates
that the potential for societal savings and for customer benefit
from participation in spot pricing rates are such that
experiments should begin.
o The State of Wisconsin adopt a framewok of an instantaneous
spot price in which to analyze and evaluate alternative electric
services offered to all levels of customers. The concepts of
the instantaneous spot price should be expanded to commercial
and residential customers at least in so much as the rate
design, cycle length, and the ability to rationalize between
utility rates can be brought into focus.
o The concept of an instantaneous spot price should be used to
rationalize all existing utility rates and load management
programs.
o The utilities should assume the lead in the design and marketing
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of a range of irrnterna'liy consistent servies to their stotervs
which will focus on the needs of their customers in terms of
cost savings, -nd as a result,, using the basits of spot :pricing
benefit to the utility. These benefits can be seen in terms of
overall cost savings, in terms of the energy requirements of the
individual customers and in terms of the reliability
requirements of the individual customers.
o A spot price experiment focussed on large consumers should be
designed within the State of Wisconsin. This should take four
major issues into consideration.
- Customers should be identified who are on time of use rates
(all current large industrial customer). Customers should
be identified who currently have energy management computers
or have the ability to respond with human schedulers to
changes in energy prices. Customers should be chosen who
have the ability either to store or reschedule energy use.
This would focus attention on industrial gas, ferrous and
non--ferrous scrap metals systems using electric arc furnaces
and metal scrapping activities. Finally, customers should
be identified on the basis of the price cycles that they
require in order to be able to respond to spot pricing.
- Utility implementation. Utilities should work with their
own system operators to develop simple means of predicting
spot prices that would be in the medium to long-run
automatic within the utility. In addition they should work
to devlop simple means for signaling prices to customers
and for evaluating response to those price signals. The
21
utilities should thoroughly evaluate the hardware
requirements for spot pricing experiments and for spot
pricing implementation based on the generic requirements for
analysis of individual customer loads, for communication
with the customer and for the customers response to spot
pricing signals.
Regulatory actions. The regulatory structure should explore
the implications of using existing time of use rates for
spot pricing experiments through adaptation of, for
instance, the current fuel adjustment clause. It is
anticipated that existing rate structures will allow for
sufficient flexibility to move forward with experiments in
spot pricing prior to the time at which new, spot rates can
be set and agreed upon in the state. In addition, the
utility should encourage the development of alternative
rates for all customer classes which can take advantage of
the concepts of the instantaneous spot price.
Research requirements. Additional research and development
is required in the area of customer response and monitoring
customer consumption patterns looking for critical loads and
looking for ways in which customers can respond to specific
lengths and levels of pricing for spot prices. In addition
the impact on the utility of different types of spot pricing
structures and cycles should be evaluated in greater detail
particularly as additional experimental data becomes
available.
